DOCUMENTS

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

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Bulletin Board Service

The DTIMS Tactics Division's Bulletin Board Service (BBS) operates 24 hours a day. It provides Army units a professional forum to extract information from the Intelligence Center and to share ideas with our instructors.

Along with instruction files, the BBS has lesson plans and slides on tactical intelligence, training scenarios, and the latest publications such as **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, **and FM 100-5, Operations**.

Our files are compressed using a PKZIP Version 110 Shareware program. This can be downloaded from the BBS. To access the BBS, you need a computer with a modem, communication software capable of ANSI-BBS terminal emulation (Pro-Comm will do), and a DSN or Commercial phone line.

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Users are asked to use appropriate language, to call no more than five times a day, to share appropriate material only, and not to upload or share commercial software.

Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce that **Lieutenant Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry** has been chosen **Writer of the Quarter (January-March 1994)** for his article, **"Light Infantry Battalion Commander, S2, and the Scout Platoon Leader."** The Writer of the Year for 1993 will be announced in the April-June 1994 issue.

Congratulations to Lieutenant Colonel Eikenberry, and thanks to all of our authors for their fine articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is your contribution that makes MIPB the professional forum for Military Intelligence.

Thanks

MIPB gratefully acknowledges Mr. John Oakley, Sergeant First Class Michael C. Taylor, and Major Patrick M. Madden for their reference material and expertise on certain topics.

We appreciate your help and encourage others to participate in the production of **MIPB**. You can do this by providing original photographs and illustrations, especially of new equipment being used for the first time. This will help to ensure we display the most current equipment in **MIPB** and in the new field manuals. Please identify the equipment shown and provide the photographer's name.

We are also interested in developing a series on these topics: Tactical intelligence, intelligence simulations, tactical tailoring, and joint operations. However, articles and photos on any MI topic are welcome.

Answering Machine

MIPB now uses an answering machine. The answering machine is provided for messages 24 hours a day or for routine subscription transactions. Comm. 602-533-6435, DSN 821-6435. These numbers will change sometime near the start of the 1st Quarter, FY 95.

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VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John F. Stewart Jr.

As the Chief of MI, in my first Vantage Point, I described our concept for military intelligence operations in a force projection Army. Since that time, we developed a vision for IEW operations that establishes a launch point, intellectually and operationally, for MI to move into the 21st century.

Our vision places the combat commander, whether in a joint organization or tactical unit, in the center of IEW operations. "The commander drives intelligence." This vision also focuses intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. Our premise: This combat support arm—MI—supports commanders in ground operations, whether in war or operations other than war. So we have put great emphasis on synchronizing intelligence with operations and force protection and on focusing MI efforts downwardly through a JTF, corps, division, and brigade. The vision also puts a premium on flexibility. It lays out the need and means for split-based operations and calls for tactically tailoring MI forces to missions. Probably most important of all, the MI concept states the requirement for the commander to be able to pull intelligence when needed (to include when on-the-move), in the form needed, and wherever commanders are.

Many of these ideas are not new. Indeed, some stem from the early 1980's; others were developed after Desert Storm as a result of the MI Relook and resultant MI Force Design Update (approved in 1993). The new aspect is articulating them in a holistic way and tying every priority, plan, and action to the MI concept and vision.

So what does this mean to you, the soldiers, leaders, and civilians of the MI Corps and of our Army? Let me cite a few specifics:

- ☐ **FM 34-1**, out in final draft now, will embody and institutionalize our MI concept in doctrine.
- ☐ **FM 34-25-3**, also in draft, will institutionalize the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) which puts intelligence under the commander's control. ASAS is in the field now and will be in all corps and divisions within two years. ACE and ASAS revolutionize and digitize commander driven intelligence.
- ☐ The Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) provides an organized means (at low to no cost) to project intelligence and allows commanders to pull it. TROJAN SPIRIT, ASAS, and TENCAP (all interoperable and compatible with joint intelligence organizations) form the core of this DISE concept.
- ☐ Intelligence at brigade level has our attention. For example, we will take the first steps to provide the commander an on-the-move, pull capability at the NTC in April. This effort is in support of overall Army efforts to digitize the battlefield. This exercise, called Operation Desert Capture II, will demonstrate split-based, focus-downwardly intelligence from national and joint organizations, through INSCOM and corps, to division, and down to brigade and battalion task force level. Perhaps more important, we will also take the first steps to bring contact, and "cav" reports up and integrate all intelligence into a relevant graphic picture.
- ☐ Training has been affected by our MI concept. We train MI leaders how to synchronize intelligence from above and below. This requires young leaders to know more than their predecessors about joint, other service, and national intelligence. We also train them to support subordinate elements, a task that is not equally implemented throughout the force. It is crucial that we train them to be not only good intelligence professionals, but also good tacticians. Thus, they can "get into the heads" of their commanders and provide better support. In addition, many of our new systems like ASAS, UAV, and Joint STARS are "crew served weapons" and require expertise by our leaders in collective training in addition to their continued excellence in individual training.

This short list constitutes a few specific aspects that resulted from our MI concept. There are more aspects involved. Many must be accomplished in units themselves. For example, our MI concept describes a new definition of intelligence readiness for our force projection Army. In the cold-war, deterrence-oriented Army, we based intelligence on a threat—the Soviet threat. For the most part, we assumed intelligence would arrive upon alert (or crisis). That was a good assumption, because we focused on Soviet military capabilities and doctrine.



During that period and right up to Desert Storm, we also played contingency "catch up." With the exception of Operation Just Cause, we "caught up" each time a crisis developed that was not related to central Europe/Warsaw Pact. In this new world, force projection intelligence must be based on the mission, since there are many potential deployment locations. If intelligence is not developed in "peacetime," well before the crisis, it will be too late when the crisis and alert come.

If you agree with me and if commanders drive intelligence, then division and corps commanders have to be connected into joint and national intelligence. The connection is necessary to clearly state their intelligence requirements and to build their own intelligence data bases (or ensure they are built in INSCOM, DIA, and elsewhere). There will always be a risk in this methodology. A corps could develop 20 contingency missions and plan and drive intelligence to develop an adequate baseline for all of them. Of course, the corps could be called to do a different contingency. But the advantage of driving its intelligence destiny will bring great benefit even with this risk. If the corps is "on-line" with joint and national organizations and is demanding a high intelligence priority, the resultant habitual connectivity, training, mutual understanding, and data base development (oriented on the commander's needs) will in turn minimize the risk even when the unexpected happens.

What I am describing is not new to some units, but we have a long way before this concept is reality. For starters, we must change the way we manage collection and data bases at joint and national organizations. I understand work is underway to do that. Our role, however, is to get "on-line" now and influence those changes. More important, we must take charge of our own intelligence destiny. We have the ability in the field now to shape our destiny, through the Corps MI Support Element (CMISE)—formed at each corps from INSCOM units—TROJAN, ASAS, and the inherent know-how in our units.

In sum, we are out front in thinking and actions. We need to stay out front in readiness to conduct force projection operations. From an intelligence view, this action takes us a step beyond exercises and other important readiness vehicles. **THE COMMANDER MUST DRIVE INTELLIGENCE!**

by Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall

Huguette, Stephanie, and I hope your Christmas was a great one and that your New Year's resolutions are all achievable. We, here at the Home of MI, have had a great year, and we look forward to the changes we know are coming in 1994. We all must have the foresight to be committed to change.

In the coming months, we will face challenges we have never faced before. Some of these include: the continuing drawdown, force modernization (and MOS restructure), introduction of new systems, changes in our intelligence doctrine, and continuing missions in unstable regions of the world.

On the individual side of this commitment, we must all strive to be successful, not only on a personal level, but in every endeavor we undertake. It may mean giving an extra 10 or 20 percent, but we must do whatever is necessary to take care of our greatest asset—our soldiers and their families.

Our Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, said, "As a Total Force, our essential reason for existence is to fight and win wars; it is upon this warfighting ethic that we have based our Army's culture, values, and traditions." These form the bedrock of our Army. Young (and not so young) soldiers are committed to the security of our great nation. We do not do it for money or medals. Our commitment lies in the protection of this great place we call **America**—Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave.

American soldiers are stationed in over 100 countries around the world. General Sullivan addressed this commitment when he said, "Since 1989, we have awarded over 650 Purple Hearts." They were awarded to our soldiers during combat against countries and tyrants around the world. These tyrants would impose their will on those who are unable to defend themselves. In some cases, these soldiers gave the last full measure of life—the ultimate sacrifice—for their country. This commitment never has been and never will be questioned.

Today, there are still many missions that require the same devotion to duty. Whether providing humanitarian aid, deterring aggression, or engaging in armed combat, we must pursue these activities with the same commitment as those warriors who have gone before us.

That same degree of commitment is present here at Fort Huachuca. From the junior private to the senior general, we strive to give the intelligence community our complete devotion. We have been told we must do more with less, because of monetary cutbacks and force modernization. We are not sure that is totally true here at the Intelligence Center. We believe we have the resources to do what we must do, but certainly not everything we want to do. This requires that we commit to being more cautious and to make the best of the resources we have.

Because we require such a commitment from our soldiers and their families, the Army must not waiver in its support to ensure this remains a team effort. Soldiers, their families, the NCO support channel, and the chain of command must all contribute.

Let's talk about the leadership it takes to reach this goal. Our partnership units here at Fort Huachuca work hand-in-hand to help solve potential problems before they get out of hand. If a problem is present, everyone, from the commander down through the entire post structure, is doing all she or he can to find solutions. This commitment requires extraordinary leadership, and it is more important now than it has ever been.

We have numerous challenges ahead. Many will work themselves out, but some will not. As we confront these challenges, we as soldiers must remain commited to excellence. It is our leadership and our commitment to our soldiers and their families that will continue to keep our Army the finest military fighting force in the world.

We here at Fort Huachuca urge you to continue to strive for excellence in everything you do. I commend you all for the excellent job you have done and the professionalism with which you will pursue your mission in the future.

Again, Huguette, Stephanie, and I hope you had a Merry Christmas, and that your new year brings good fortune to you and yours. "Always Out Front."

FROM THE EDITOR

It is our desire at **MIPB** to capture the rapid pace of the intelligence community's advance into the "information warfare age." Providing focused support to the commander at all levels in the Army and joint community is difficult given physical constraints and significant changes within intelligence. The common thread in this issue is innovative and flexible adaptation to accomplish a difficult mission.

Hopefully, we are accomplishing our mission of serving as a forum for discussing intelligence doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, we cannot do it alone. We need your input to support this goal. The quality of **MIPB** directly reflects the input we receive from the intelligence community. **MIPB** needs you to submit feature articles, to provide feedback with letters to the editor, and to participate in the book review program.

MIPB accepts articles covering all facets of military intelligence. Articles should be 8 to 15 double-spaced pages. Please include graphics or photographs if at all possible, and a disk with your article in Word Perfect (preferred), or ASCII, Ami Pro 1.2/2.0, MS Word, Multimate, or Word Star 4.0/5.0/6.0. Include a short biography, home address, and work and home phone numbers.

Concurrently, "the field" must ensure it uses all of the organizations here at Fort Huachuca. It is especially critical that intelligence professionals keep abreast of the current changes in military intelligence. A condensed phone listing of some of the critical organizations at Fort Huachuca is printed inside the front cover. This is not an all inclusive listing.

I strongly encourage everyone to read the CG's column on intelligence developments on page 2, LTC Frketic's letter to the editor and the editor's response on page 5, and CW2 Beasley's review of Alvin and Heidi Toeffler's book **War and Anti-War** on page 50, in addition to the other articles. All three articles provide timely feedback on pertinent issues within intelligence.

A special thanks to all the authors of this issue's outstanding features, especially to Dr. Goldman, Mr. Hodge, and Mr. Finley for their patient assistance. All of the authors have helped improve professionalism within the intelligence community.

Stephen B Leader

LETTERS

To the Editor:

I read with interest the letter to the editor from LTC Gary E. Phillips (July-September 1993) on the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Concept.

For those of us who have lived through the past 20 or 25 years of doctrinal change and advance, the ACE appears to be a return to the days of the early 1980's when the concept of a direct support element (DSE) did not meet our needs in the tactical intelligence world. It did not meet our needs because of the confusion in responsibility and functions between the G2 and the MI battalion.

The maturing of our system and the move of the DSE to the HHC of the division (as the division tactical operations center support element [DTOCSE]) solved most of the early problems. While we can make any organization work, the system and organization we have is not broken. In response to the fledgling ACE concept, I sent a letter to the Director of Combat Developments (DCD) at the Intelligence Center listing some of my concerns, which I also express here.

Current ACE documents address and implement a major change in the way we perform tactical intelligence. If we are driven by doctrine, organization, people, processes or functions, and technology, then having reviewed the concept, I have some concerns in the areas of organization, functions, and equipment (technology).

A key factor in this change is the integration of the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) and the DTOCSE into the ACE. While documents relating to the ACE Concept address the functions of the targeting, battle management, analysis, and collection management nodes, they minimize some difficulties. Specifically, they minimize difficulties with collection management. Collection management is, in my opinion, our weakest area at the tactical level. We have made tremendous strides in the past three or four years with the introduction of the IEW Synchronization Matrix, but it still remains our weakest area. Conversely, technical data base building and technical asset tasking are among our strengths.

This is a critical MI unit requirement and skill since the technical data bases do not exist to support tactical SIGINT system tasking for all contingency areas. We are overlaying a strength on a weakness which will only weaken the entire tactical collection effort.

A TCAE remains critical to the MI unit and must be separate from the ACE. I strongly recommend downsizing the ACE and including at least ten 98C's in the general support company of the divisional battalion to build technical data bases and perform asset tasking.

The ACE concept also indicates that the collocation of the tactical operations center support element and the TCAE improves the synchronization of intelligence operations. This may be true; however, I have never served in a unit where this has been an issue. More important, I believe (based on numerous division G2 section and MI battalion assignments) that the collocation will have a detrimental effect on intelligence operations. As a division G2, I looked to the MI battalion commander as a "sanity check." He was another MI lieutenant colonel who I could go to and say, "The situation looks like this to me. What do you think?"

The MI battalion commander also often pointed out aspects of the situation I may not have seen. As an MI battalion commander, I have attempted to perform the same function for the G2. The integration of the TCAE into the ACE will largely negate this valuable symbiotic relationship.

The total ACE concept involves the introduction of many new systems (such as ASAS, TROJAN SPIRIT, MITT, GBSC-L). Until these systems are in place and working, the concept will be difficult to implement, and there is little redundancy in the system. As an example, should the division main command post suffer catastrophic destruction, the MI battalion can reconstitute a G2 section from the TCAE and S3 that could perform critical G2 functions until other actions could be taken. With the ACE concept, all the eggs are in one basket until the TO&E and automation equipment are actually in place for the mobile TOCs.

My final comment involves G2/G3 working relationships. Over the past eight years, the synchronization of G2/G3 at the division level has improved immensely. I believe this is partially the result of the incorporation of **all** of the G2 into the division HHC. This is not addressed in any of the documents. My concern (and caution) is that we do not lose the close and harmonious working relationship that has evolved between intelligence and operations by moving most of the G2 back to the MI battalion.

In the past few months I have spent a great deal of additional brain power and time thinking about this issue. I feel even more strongly than when I wrote the letter to DCD that the ACE is **NOT THE WAY OF THE FUTURE**. We need to firmly retain our correct doctrinal basis where the G2 is responsible to the commander for intelligence production, target development, and battle damage assessment to support the decision-making process and combat operations. The G2 must direct all aspects of the intelligence cycle, drive the collection effort, process intelligence, and then ensure its timely and accurate dissemination. The MI unit commander is fully occupied with his mission of asset management as well as fighting, leading, and sustaining his organization. Both of these are full-time occupations, and the ACE only serves to dirty the waters and confuse functions again.

In summary, the ACE concept can be made to work. We can make anything work with good people. However, it it largely dependent on the

(Continued on page 41)

Forecasting the Threat

by Alan R. Goldman, Ph.D.

What dynamics cause war? Can we forecast when and where wars involving the United States are likely to occur?

This article introduces military threat forecasts in support of war planners and force developers. In this article it is possible to provide only an introduction and methodology to threat forecasts.

We assume that the international community suffers from the same forces and defects that previously took us down the road to war, in spite of the absence of a clear threat today. In fact, as we watch events unfold in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Korean Peninsula, they remind us of past wars that we failed to anticipate.

Military forecasting is both an art and the product of several academic disciplines, taken mainly from history and the social sciences. It requires an inquiring mind that enjoys dealing with contradiction. The logic of threat analysis follows a nonlinear path.

The Logic of Threat Analysis

Nations and their armed forces react to perceptions of each other. Common sense, straight-line approaches to problems often fail. Pacifism, isolationism, neutrality, appeasement, activism, and rearmament failed to prevent war in the 1930's. Allied and axis plans and policies that seemed logical had unanticipated results abroad. Peace policies can lead to war; war preparation can lead to peace or war, depending on timing. Fear and confidence have intangible and contradictory qualities. A nation that fears the future is operating in a different realm than a nation that is confident of what lies ahead. Fear fosters hate and aggression. Signals between rivals are misread, especially when perceived through cultural filters. National leaders dealing with domestic politics must respond to multiple and often conflicting pressures that are not easily discernible or measurable.

Military leaders are required to operate at the different levels of politics, strategy, doctrine, tactics, and technology. This is a serious problem during periods of dramatic change in global security. What military leaders believe to be operational necessities may be strategic blunders, such as the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. When forecasting threat, an analyst must deal with all of these complexities. Nevertheless, threat forecasts are often accurate and useful to senior military planners and decision makers.

The U.S. Navy began planning for war with Japan in 1911. Over time, the United States developed contingency plans—the "rainbow plans"—for war. In 1986 the U.S. Army Forecast was also accurate (occurring as it did before operations in Somalia, Panama, Desert Storm, and the nuclear threat from North Korea). The Forecast said the Army must prepare to perform the following missions:

> *Conduct low-intensity, political/military operations in every region of the world; participate fully in coalition strategy of deterrence in Europe and Northeast Asia; conduct mid-in-*

tensity operations, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean; conduct warfare alongside allies at the mid- to high-intensity levels in the Middle East, Europe, and Northeast Asia, with the greatest risk of high-intensity [war]...in the Middle East.

Clear estimates, projections, and forecasts can provide critical support to war planners and force developers. But how do analysts forecast 5 to 20 years into the future?

Forecasting The Threat

Comprehensive threat analysis must answer the age-old questions of who, when, where, how, what, and why. Experience with threat analysis has shown that who, when, and where can be a single question. Specifically, the forecast of future conflicts allows the analyst to group and resolve one set of questions war planners and strategists find critical:

- ☐ Where will future conflicts involving U.S. Forces occur?
- ☐ Who will be combatants in war or antagonists in operations other than war?
- ☐ When will the conflicts occur (in 10, 20, or 30 years)?
- ☐ How will they fight? This issue involves how adversaries will formulate strategy, employ doctrine, and deploy their forces.
- ☐ What will the combatants bring to the future battlefield? This involves projecting the needed organization, equipment, logistics, mobilization and manufacturing capacity, movement rates, and stockpiles for up to 20 years into the future.

These answers feed the complex system that our armed forces use to plan, program, and budget for future forces; and to assist the military in devising plans and strategies for deterring or waging conflicts. Often the conflict involves coalition partners whose strategies and forces must also be forecast.

Existing Intelligence Products

U.S. Army Intelligence produces a family of products to answer who, where, when, how, and what. These studies form a family because of their tight relationship. There is an obvious requirement for consistency from one level of forecast to the next:

- ☐ **Global Security Forecast** is a 30-year forecast of where, when, and between whom conflicts are likely to occur.
- ☐ **Battlefield Development Plans** are 5- to 20-year forecasts of how selected threat forces will organize and operate on the battlefield.
- ☐ Automated and hard-copy data bases, such as the **Stylized Country Force Assessments** and the **Army Force Planning and Data Assumptions,** provide detailed projections on order of battle, equipment, logistics, and readiness (what ground, air, and naval forces a threat will bring to the battlefield) 2 to 25 years into the future.
- ☐ Other studies relate to the weapons acquisition strategies and the overall military power and potential of selected foreign military forces.

Forecasting future wars requires thought and analysis at different levels of the security and military environment: the international level, the link between the international level and the national level, and the national and subnational level.

The Uneven Growth of Power

Change in the global threat environment is caused by the differential growth of power over time. Power shifts induce new fears, provoke new perceptions of a threat, and can create the conditions for conflict. The fear that a rival can or will take, possibly by force, something a country values causes reactions that create the conditions for conflict. The threat can be tangible such as territory or standard of living, or intangible such as prestige. The realist school of political science as exemplified by Robert Gilpin in **War and Change in World Politics** is a good source for understanding the central role of power and its relationship to war.

A shift in relative economic power of 30 to 40 percent over a 25-year period, measured in gross national product (GNP), between peaceful rivals sets the stage for future conflict. A power shift of this magnitude would certainly affect threat perceptions and cause a change to their armed forces. For example, the leaders of Great Britain reacted to the relative rise of German economic power which was eventually used to build battleships, panzer armies, and bombers. London reconciled with France, its old rival, and even set aside imperial priorities to build new ships, fighter aircraft, and armies.

An "oily rag" analogy is appropriate. A trained analyst can identify the "oily rags" within the international community. He does this by collecting trends data on elements of power including industrial production, GNP, educational achievements, demography, and order of battle. A state's power and influence can be approximated, and relative changes in power can be tracked by meshing trends data that captures the various elements of a state's power. Dr. Ray Cline's book **World Power Assessment** demonstrates the use of numerical data to determine the current power of states. Paul Kennedy's

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is also essential reading on this subject. Trends data collected from sources such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and defense attache reporting is the analyst's tool for assessing future power. With trends data, and an appreciation of the realist school of international relations, the analyst is prepared to forecast where, when, and among whom conflict will occur.

Whether a country will actually engage in armed conflict is impossible to predict. It is impossible to know who will be in power or what decisions will be made 10 or 20 years into the future. However, analysts can predict conditions that could lead to armed conflict. The prudent policy maker and planner must deal with the "oily rags" as if they will result in future conflicts.

> "Forecasting foreign military capabilities involves drawing from forecasts of future wars and doctrine, then applying a different set of methods and techniques."

Strategic and Doctrinal Forecasts

Forecasting foreign military strategy and doctrine involves working at the junction between the international system and the domestic political system. Barry Posen, in **The Sources of Military Doctrine**, explains how both balance of power and bureaucratic dynamics drive military doctrine.

Forecasting foreign military capabilities involves drawing from forecasts of future wars and doctrine, then applying a different set of methods and techniques. Within this level of analysis there is a subhierarchy that at the upper end calls for analyzing and stating a country's national interests, goals, and objectives. After identifying the national goals and the external threat, a mission statement for a future force is prepared. Drawing on the mission statement, an unconstrained force can be postulated.

At the next level, a constrained force must be forecast. This is done by imposing explicit budgetary, bureaucratic, and geographic constraints on the overall force, the service components, and each combat arm.

Finally, a micro-level calendar of events is needed that shows from the bottom up how the current force structure will change over time to become the constrained force of the future. This product will demonstrate when new units are added and old units subtracted from the force, and when and where new and old items of equipment are exchanged or reallocated. The end result is a forecast with representational tables of organization and equipment (TOE) displayed at different time frames, with the appropriate logistical tail.

To do realistic analysis, the analyst should act as the senior military planner and decision maker of a country. In this role the analyst inherits an existing military force—a force that has changed over the years in response to external threats and goals; and internal objectives, doctrine, and constraints. The analyst must then study and absorb the nature of the current force. Even more important, he must analyze why a force developed the way it did, since other options were available. The analyst should discover if the force is threat driven, bureaucratically driven, or a combination. Finally, the analyst must define a new or continuing military requirement and analyze how it is modified by realistic constraints.

As an example, the analyst assumes the role of a military planner operating within the context of a country with a defensive doctrine. He draws upon a strong technology base with a declining population.The analyst-planner perceives a rising military threat from an economically and demographically vibrant neighbor with a preponderance of armor-heavy ground forces. Therefore, he would anticipate a force development strategy that emphasizes high technology munitions, mines, antitank weapons, and enhanced air forces to contain the growing threat. Doctrinal modifications calling for a preemptive attack would further reshape the force.

The analyst must also be aware of the bureaucratic pressures and resource constraints that will push the force in undesirable directions. For instance, the analyst planner may be confronted with a long force-development cycle, tight budgets, an isolationist environment, and a political elite chosen from the navy. While these limiting pressures will not affect the future unconstrained force requirement, it will affect the force that is fielded. A good analyst must explicitly account for and weigh all the factors driving the future force.

Systematic Analysis

To thoroughly analyze a future foreign force from the strategic level down to unit TOEs, analysts working as teams should follow these 12 steps.

1. Analyze economic, demographic, political, and military trends. Forecast the global and regional security environment, and the potential for conflict.

2. Identify the evolving threat perceptions of the participants.

3. Identify the enduring and evolving national interests, goals, and objectives of key constituencies.

4. Produce a realistic mission and doctrine statement for the evolving military forces (offensive/de-

fensive/deterrent).

5. Draw a detailed requirement for an unconstrained future force in terms of functions, units, and equipment.

6. Compare the current force with unconstrained requirements for a future force.

7. Explicitly state the anticipated constraints—budgetary, bureaucratic, demographic, diplomatic, and geographic—on the desired unconstrained future force.

8. Modify the desired force according to the constraints and state the constrained force requirements by service. Requirements should address missions, functions, concept of operation, unit, and equipment.

9. Beginning with the current force structure, build a future force from the bottom up (for example, battalions to corps) by adding units and equipment over specified time frames.

10. Employ the new force on the battlefield. Display its objectives; command, control, communications, and computers (C^4); combined arms and other unit deployments; employment; and battlefield operating systems.

11. Compare and wargame the force against the perceived hostile force of the future.

12. Modify the future force to overcome assessed deficiencies.

Acting as the senior national military planner and decision maker, the analyst must ask: Who will I fear? Who will fear me? And when? Trends analysis relating to the rise and fall of power is your guide. Factor in the history and culture of the country you represent to determine how threat perceptions may be modified and sharpened. For example, if the analyst acts as the senior leadership of South Korea, the analyst would consider the short-term threat from a desperate North Korea, the rising power of China, and the historical problems with Japan.

The analyst must define the military response to the changing international security environment. This involves in-depth, nonlinear threat analysis. Thus, the analyst must ask: What are my potential adversaries' future force requirements? What are my future force requirements? What are my potential adversaries' goals and constraints? What are my goals and restraints? As a subject matter expert on a country or region, using economic and demographic trends, you make the forecast.

There is a division of labor. Not everyone is expected to operate at each level of analysis. It is important to coordinate with counterparts who work the different levels and who analyze opposing countries. There is no single path or formula to success. It is still a process of trial and error, constant study, and lessons learned. Someday the intelligence community will create analytic structures and courses of instructions to facilitate the art of forecasting.



The Future

The "road to war" is difficult to detect in the early stages even when the spotlight is on the "road." The road is even more obscure and indirect when minor powers act as magnets for the major powers. The relationships in Europe today are reminiscent of earlier religious, ethnic, and major power tensions that degenerated into general conflict. The risk today in Europe is that Eastern Orthodox southern Slavs who are in economic decline will look to Russia for protection, while Catholics in middle Europe are drawn into an expanding German economic zone. This could once again draw the great European powers into conflict.

Asia is gaining economic ascendancy and engaging in sharp rivalries. In time, the historic struggle between Japan and China for regional primacy could easily become enmeshed with Korean and Siberian politics, thereby creating the conditions for wider conflict.

Analysts have often successfully forecast armed conflict involving U.S. Military Forces, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary. **Nevertheless, there is still neither a systematic method nor an established group of analysts charged with long-range threat forecasts.** In an era in which the world has become more complicated, the blurring of the threat has resulted in the drawdown of U.S. Armed Forces. It would be prudent to create a permanent analytic cell to focus on systematically forecasting long-range trends that could lead to another Pearl Harbor.

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KOREA: A Time for Vigilance



by Homer T. Hodge

Experts believe the volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula will soon reach its most unpredictable and dangerous stage since the end of the Korean War. In 1991 and 1992, positive diplomatic developments between North and South Korea seemed to point toward a major reduction of tensions. Today, however, there are ominous indications that these developments could fail to materialize. The U.S., while welcoming a resolution of tensions, must remain vigiliant and be prepared to assist in the defense of South Korea, if necessary.

U.S. Involvement

For four decades, the U.S. has maintained forces in Korea at the behest of the South Korean government. The presence of American military serves one purpose: to deter North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]) from renewing armed aggression against South Korea (the Republic of Korea [ROK]). In this cause, 89 Americans have been killed and 132 wounded in action since the armistice ended the Korean War on July 27, 1953.[1]

U.S. military involvement in Korea began as a consequence of the Cold War. However, ROK's growing economic and political importance and its friendship with the U.S. continue to validate the need for close security ties. Even North Korea's allies, notably the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), recognize the importance of the ROK. Both have established diplomatic and economic relations with the ROK.

The DPRK is more isolated from the international community than any time in its history, and may be headed for economic and social collapse. Indeed, there are increasing numbers of reports concerning food, fuel, and electricity shortages and even malnutrition in the DPRK. Travellers to and a defector from the DPRK have indicated that there have been scattered instances of civil disturbance because of food shortages.

Reunification

For over a thousand years, Korea had been a single homogeneous country—ethnically and culturally. At the end of World War II, as a temporary measure, the U.S. and the Soviet Union divided Korea along 38 degrees north latitude. Supposedly, this was done as a means to facilitate the surrender and demobilization of Japanese forces. This division quickly became permanent as U.S. and Soviet relations cooled. By 1948, two governments, each claiming sovereignty over the entire peninsula, had become entrenched. The Soviets supported the northern government (the DPRK) and the U.S. supported the southern government (the ROK).[2]

Since the division, the DPRK's foremost national objective has been a reunifed Korea under DPRK rule. All Koreans, north and south, passionately hope for reunification. While the ROK has taken a more pragmatic approach, DPRK leadership has never accepted the reality of two sovereign Korean nations sharing the peninsula.

The same senior leadership has remained in power in the DPRK since it was formed. These leaders have devoted their lives to realizing an independent, unified, and communist Korea. They spent their early adulthood waging a guerrilla war against Japanese invaders to reach that goal. From DPRK's perspective, a terrible crime was perpetrated on the Korean people when the country was divided. The North Korean leadership has dedicated their lives to correcting this crime through reunification by any means.

In June 1950, the DPRK initiated the Korean War by launching an attack against the ROK in an effort to reunify the peninsula. Although the U.N. condemned this action as an attack by one nation against another, the DPRK viewed it differently. In their eyes, they were justified in liberating their southern brothers and sisters from a "puppet government" installed and supported by foreigners. They believed they were making Korea whole once again.

Although the war ended in stalemate, there is little evidence to suggest that the DPRK has renounced its national goal of reunification by whatever means necessary. Today, two armed camps continue to face each other across a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ).

DPRK Forces

Despite a tremendous economic burden on a population of only 21 million, the DPRK continues to spend about 25 percent of its GNP on defense. It maintains a highly trained, mobile armed force of 1.2 million active duty personnel, augmented by a trained reserve force of 5 million. It is the fourth largest army in the world. The million-man ground forces are organized into—

- ☐ Four frontline corps.
- ☐ Four mechanized corps.
- ☐ An armored corps.
- ☐ An artillery corps.
- ☐ Five other corps-size units deployed throughout the DPRK.

These forces are forward deployed: 65 percent of DPRK's ground forces are within 60 miles of the DMZ.[3] They are equipped with 3,500 tanks, 4,000 armored personnel carriers, 8,400 artillery pieces (many of which are self-propelled), and 2,400 multiple rocket launchers. They are organized and deployed to carry out offensive operations against the ROK, employing surprise, speed, chemical weapons, and overwhelming shock.[4]

The North Koreans are now producing SCUD missiles and have developed a version with an extended range of 500 kilometers that can reach any target in the ROK. Additionally, they are conducting tests of another surface-to-surface missile, the No Dong 1, which has a range of 1,000 kilometers. This missile can reach targets in western Japan.[5] Notably, North Korea can produce most types of military equipment, including armor and artillery, and has stockpiled sufficient ammunition, food, and fuel in hardened underground facilities to sustain combat operations for several months without foreign assistance.[6]

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korean army defectors reported that North Korean plans are to—

- ☐ Neutralize the bulk of ROK forces near the DMZ.
- ☐ Disrupt ROK mobilization and U.S. reinforcement.
- ☐ Isolate Seoul.
- ☐ Initiate peace negotiations within seven days.[7]

The infantry divisions of the frontline corps, supported by artillery, would execute a conventional attack through multiple avenues of approach across the DMZ to breach ROK forward defenses. The brigades of the mechanized corps, augmented with additional armor and self-propelled artillery, would exploit openings in ROK defenses to penetrate deep into the rear. North Korea's initial attack would be supported by attacks on a "second front" in rear areas by units of the 60,000 man DPRK special operations forces.[8] These units would infiltrate into the ROK by air, sea, and land to attack airfields, lines of communication, command and control facilities, and create confusion and paralysis.



The North Koreans expect to achieve initial air superiority by neutralizing ROK and U.S. air capabilities with a combination of special operations forces' raids and SCUD-delivered chemical attacks on air facilities.

The ultimate goal of an attack on the ROK would be the complete defeat of ROK and in-country U.S.

forces, and to control the entire peninsula before the arrival of substantial heavy U.S. forces. The DPRK would then present the world with a *fait accompli.* Although they could expect worldwide condemnation and economic sanctions, the DPRK leadership would consider this a small price to pay for reunification on their terms.

Despite a December 1991 formal agreement with the ROK to negotiate a state of mutual nonaggression, cooperation, and peace, there has been little progress. There is no evidence that the DPRK actually reduced the size of its military or relaxed its offensive force posture. On the contrary, on May 15, 1992, three armed North Korean soldiers dressed in ROK military uniforms infiltrated into the southern half of the DMZ before ROK soldiers discovered and killed them.[9] This aggressive act occurred during DPRK/ROK negotiations to reduce tensions on the peninsula.

More recently, there is evidence of an improved North Korean offensive capability with an increased number of artillery weapons. These include 240-mm multiple rocket launchers and long-range 170-mm field guns, supporting their combat forces on the DMZ.[10]



Nuclear Capability

Mounting evidence suggests that the DPRK is working toward developing nuclear arms. Some reports suggest they may already possess one or more nuclear weapons. For at least the past 20 years, the DPRK has sought to acquire the technology and materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons.

In 1965, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with a small research reactor they installed at a nuclear research center at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of the capital Pyongyang. In 1980 and 1985, they built two larger reactors in the same area. These two reactors are capable of producing the plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons production.[11]

The DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. However, the North Koreans did not sign a Nuclear Safeguards Accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would have permitted inspections of their nuclear facilities until January 1992. The accord was drafted in response to international concern about nuclear proliferation. Although the DPRK and ROK agreed to a North-South denuclearization declaration in December 1991, to date they have not agreed on specific terms of the agreement. In May 1992, the IAEA conducted its first preliminary inspection of DPRK nuclear facilities. The North Koreans admitted that a very small amount of plutonium was produced but denied any intent to produce weapons.[12]

Suspicions remain that the DPRK is intent on developing a nuclear weapon and has probably produced more plutonium than they admit to. The DPRK refused any further inspections and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. This is in response to IAEA insistence they be permitted to reinspect two suspicious waste storage sites. Subsequently, they agreed to suspend withdrawal from the NPT; however, they will only permit certain routine IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities.

Moreover, they have not, and repeatedly state they **will not**, open all nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.[13] In particular, it seems unlikely they will permit further inspection of two suspicious waste storage areas. Formal discussions between senior U.S. and North Korean representatives over the nuclear issue have produced only superficial progress. This suggests that the North Koreans are participating merely to "buy time" and to avoid a premature international crisis.

A Stagnant Economy

The economy in North Korea continues to stagnate and deteriorate because of its reliance on central planning and its isolation from global economic affairs. In the past, the government's mobilization

and management of financial and production capabilities, together with vital technical and scientific assistance from the Soviet Union and China, promoted significant growth and development.

However, the subordination of economics to politics and a devotion to Marxist dogma eliminated the critical agents of innovation and progress. Without the impetus toward more advanced productive and technological capabilities, the DPRK's GNP is falling increasingly short of its potential. Economic stagnation and deterioration is further aggravated by a diversion of an excessive 25 percent of its GNP to defense spending.

DPRK adherence to a national philosophy of self-reliance has isolated it further from the global economic system. As a result, the country failed to adopt modern technology and improved management methods. Given these structural flaws and inadequacies, the economy is apparently grinding to a standstill. Clearly, the time when North Korea must consider its own version of Perestroika or face economic dysfunctionality and collapse is close at hand.

The DPRK is rapidly running out of alternatives for ensuring its political survival and reunification of the peninsula on its terms. There is little prospect of sufficient foreign aid to arrest the economic decline. Food shortages result in widespread undernourishment and even malnutrition throughout the populace. The DPRK is plagued by continued shortages of oil to support industry, transportation, and daily life.

A peaceful reunification would almost certainly result in a settlement similiar to German reunification. If Korea were reunified in this way the ROK would dominate the country. This would be unacceptable to the DPRK leadership. As economic conditions worsen, the North Korean people may not support Kim Chong Il, the son and heir apparent to Kim Il Song, who has led North Korea since 1945. In an effort to divert attention from these hardships, solidify popular support, and establish his legitimacy, the younger Kim may gamble on reunification by military force. The North Korean leaders realize that time is not on their side; if they elect to use force, they must strike soon.

The Future

The next two years may be the most dangerous period in Korea since the end of the war. Events on the Korean Peninsula will affect the balance of power in Northeast Asia, thereby affecting vital U.S. national interests. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to pursue a policy that emphasizes deterrence and resolve. This resolve is best demonstrated by the continued presence of U.S. Army combat forces (the 2d Infantry Division) deployed astride the major avenue of approach to Seoul. No other display of force demonstrates this resolve so emphatically.

Deployment of U.S. Army forces in "harm's way" serves as a tripwire and clearly sends the message to Pyongyang that a DPRK attack will trigger a rapid and overwhelming military response from the U.S. The essence of this resolve should signal a clear



message to the DPRK that they cannot win.

However, U.S. forces that may conduct combat operations in the Korean Peninsula must understand that they will face a better trained, more formidable, and far more determined enemy than the Iraqis. This combat would occur in less favorable climatic conditions and over terrain far more hostile than the Kuwaiti desert. Regardless of the final outcome, it will not be a hundred-hour ground war.

Endnotes

1. Casualty figures provided by LTC Charles T. Guthrie, USA, Eighth U.S. Army, U.S. Forces Korea Liaison Office, Washington DC.
2. Donald S. MacDonald, "The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea," **The Washington Quarterly,** Summer 1992, 145.
3. **North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength,** DIA, Washington, DC , October 91, 9-10, 40-43.
4. Ibid., 11.
5. "Ship Carrying Missiles Believed Bound for Syria," **The Houston Chronicle**, 21 February 92, A16.
6. **North Korea: The Foundations of Military Strength**, 34.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid., 4-5.
9. "S. Korea Warns North Against Provocation," **The Reuters Library Report**, 16 June 92.
10. "North Korea Bolsters Border Force," **The Washington Post**, 6 November 93, 19.
11. Don Oberdorfer, "N. Korea Seen Closer to A-Bomb," **The Washington Post**, 23 February 92, A1, A26.
12. "Bomb and Bombast," **Far Eastern Economic Review**, 4 June 92, 24.
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Intelligence Failure Matrix

by James P. Finley

Many in the intelligence community think technology can overcome intelligence problems. Computers can handle and track masses of information. Mathematical models compile indicators and identify possible crises. Satellites relay voice and pictures in near-real time. Decision makers have never had so much information so fast.

Technology serves us well in gathering and quantifying complex information. However, humans are still fallible in matters of analysis and response. The recognition of fallibility is the first step toward understanding the process. The next step is to understand where deficiencies are likely to occur. Finally, we must ensure intelligence failures are not the result of training deficiencies.

This matrix is the result of research on many historical intelligence failures. Readers are invited to incorporate their own lessons learned into this table.

The key to guarding against intelligence deficiencies lies in education and training. Problems within the mind can only be addressed by changing attitudes and judgmental weaknesses.

Intelligence Faults	Cause	Solution
Information		
Too much information	-enemy deception -too few analysts	-adequate staffing -improved analysis (better systems and training)
Too little information	-failure to assign target -enemy OPSEC	-improved analysis
Conflicting data	-enemy deception	-improved analysis
Ambiguous data	-enemy OPSEC -enemy deception	-improved analysis
Unreliable data	-enemy deception -unreliable source	-improved analysis
Process		
Slow distribution of information	-clogged channels -information overload -misunderstood urgency or priority	-organizational/ procedural reform
Not distributed to all who need intelligence	-security too restrictive -boss shielded from intelligence -interservice/ agency rivalries	-organizational/ procedural reform -interservice cooperation
Piecemeal distribution	-faulty procedures	-procedural reform
Over-reliance on SIGINT	-past successes of SIGINT -better scientific certainty	-education
Over-reliance on IMINT	-past successes of IMINT -better scientific certainty	-education
Technology failures	-poor maintenance -operator failure -limits of technology	-training -improved technology

Judgment		
Failure to listen to expert advice	-overconfidence -conditioning	-train the leader to remain open to expert opinions -Donald McLachlan: "Intelligence is ineffective without showmanship...."
Judgment governed by expectations	-psychological conditioning	-objective analysis
Wishful thinking	-psychological conditioning	-training increases awareness of this
Adherence to false assumptions	-conditioning	-challenge assumptions
Group dynamics don't allow dissent	-group pressures	-decision makers must listen to dissenting opinions
Belief in one's invulnerability	-superiority complex	-careful study of history
The "cry wolf" syndrome	-desensitized by repetition -unwilling to put troops on constant alert	-accept the costs of false alerts
Reliance on inaccurate historical analogy	-reckless, biased, or injudicious use of history	-careful study of history
Judging the enemy by your standards	-human nature	-know the mind and culture of the target
Inaction	-laziness -unawareness	-train on the necessity of intelligent actions
Bad Luck	-limitation of human knowledge	-prepare for the unexpected

Nobody Likes to be Surprised: Intelligence Failures

by James P. Finley

In his article "Intelligence and Military History," Keith Jeffery reflects: "We usually know more about intelligence failures than successes."[1] The time devoted to dissecting intelligence failures is indicative of the frustration we feel over our inability to consistently predict the future. Because of our usually reliable intelligence-gathering apparatus, there is a tendency in America to call anything less than clairvoyance a failure.

Moreover, MI's successes in predicting enemy intentions often go to the grave with the analyst or to the shredder because of security classifications. While important lessons are lost, there are many we can address.

Here, I have attempted to analyze the cause of intelligence failures, using examples that directly affected U.S. military operations.

"The human tendency to explain events according to expectations and beliefs, and resistance to information that overturns opinions, played a key role in the Intelligence Failure."

Pearl Harbor

That well-known photograph of the **USS Arizona** slipping into the shallows of Pearl Harbor stings the American consciousness. It is the nightmare of every member of the intelligence community. Given that the United States could read top secret Japanese codes in 1941, how could we have been surprised on the morning of December 7?

American military and political leaders had access to information that warned of a Japanese attack. However, the information was fragmented, processed in different agencies, or slowed in bureaucratic channels. There was no central clearinghouse for intelligence where all the pieces of the puzzle could be put together. Because of the high volume of information, "no single person or agency ever had at any given moment all the signals existing in this vast information network."[2]

To further complicate matters, the intelligence was contradictory. Information from MAGIC (an American code name given to intercepts of Japanese codes) communications intelligence pointed to a Japanese attack in Southeast Asia. Coast watchers sighted Japanese troop movements to Manchuria. In Hawaii, there were reports of a possible Japanese attack on Soviet Russia, and there were alerts against local sabotage. Inside Washington, all of these signals competed with intelligence reports flowing in from Europe.

U.S. Army and Navy intelligence predicted a Japanese attack on November 30 or December 7 on Malaya and Singapore, Borneo, Guam, or the Philippines. There was no shortage of information that an attack was imminent. The question was where would it occur. Author Roberta Wohlstetter puts the question this way: "If we could enumerate accurately the British and Dutch targets and give credence to a Japanese attack against them either on November 30 or December 7, why were we not expecting a specific danger to **ourselves?**"

Wohlstetter concludes: "We failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones. There is a difference, then, between having a signal available somewhere in the heap of irrelevancies, and perceiving it as a warning; and there is also a differ-

ence between perceiving it as a warning, and acting or getting action on it."[3]

It has always been easier for intelligence analysts to measure enemy capabilities and determine means of attack than to predict enemy intentions. Understandably, analysts are reluctant to make educated guesses.



The question of **where** an attack would occur was wrongly answered just before Pearl Harbor when analysts prepared a list of possible targets which omitted Hawaii. For years, in training exercises, U.S. planners considered Hawaii a potential target. However, the common belief that the islands were an impregnable fortress caused U.S. intelligence to dismiss this as a possibility.

No one in the Far East U.S. military establishment believed Pearl Harbor was a Japanese target. It was easy to misinterpret indications of the attack. The human tendency to explain events according to expectations and beliefs, as well as resistance to information that overturns opinions, played a key role in the intelligence failure. Other factors included—

- ☐ A mass of conflicting information.
- ☐ Japanese operations security.
- ☐ Deception operations.
- ☐ Recent changes in military capabilities.
- ☐ Our own communications security which denied information to key officers.

At Pearl Harbor, analysts misjudged enemy capabilities. They assessed Japanese torpedoes as requiring a depth of approximately 60 feet. These torpedoes would be worthless in the 30- to 40-foot shallows of Pearl Harbor. Remarkably, only a week before the attack, the Japanese developed an improved torpedo that could navigate these shallower depths.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the War Department dispatched warnings to Admiral Kimmel. The CNO said, on November 27, that: "An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.... The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, the Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.... Execute an appropriate defensive deployment."

Concurrently, the War Department said: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated...hostile action possible at any moment." On December 3, the CNO warned: "Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers...."[4] Special importance was not attached to these messages, since none of them specifically mentioned Hawaii, and because the Japanese were not told to burn **all** of their codes.

Sometimes even clear signals are rendered useless by operational inaction. U.S. defense plans anticipated that a single submarine attack would mean that a larger surface force was in the area. Yet, when an enemy submarine was confirmed in the area on December 7 at 6:40 a.m., the alert status was not changed.[5]

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of Army Far Eastern Intelligence in Washington, was troubled by the implications of information intercepted via the "winds" code. He tried to relay that information to Hawaii, but the security classification of this intelli-

gence could not be transmitted through normal channels.

He then sent a message in the clear to the Army intelligence officer in Hawaii, Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fiedler, instructing him to "Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather." Fiedler, who was inexperienced, filed the message and did not try to contact Rochefort. He simply did not see any urgency in this kind of routine message.[6]

When Admiral Kimmel was informed that the Japanese were destroying their codes, he attached no particular importance to the message. The Japanese regularly burned classified documents at the consulate in Honolulu.

After Pearl Harbor, congressional findings noted the tendency of American military leaders to accept personal responsibility for actions without asking for orders from a superior.

In addition, Wohlstetter found that during this period there existed a prejudice against intellectuals and intelligence specialists. She said, "[Intelligence officers'] efforts were unsuccessful because of the poor repute associated with intelligence, inferior rank, and the province of the specialist...."[7]

Analysts received information piecemeal over an extended period and were seldom able to evaluate the cumulative weight of the information. MAGIC intercepts were sent to decision makers one at a time. These fragments were never examined together.

Expectations play a part in determining how information is interpreted. For example, an Army lieutenant received information from a radar station about approaching aircraft on the morning of December 7. Regrettably, he believed the aircraft were friendly and told the radar operators to forget it. The "wishful-thinking" phenomenon is closely related to expectations.

We all have a tendency to reshape information to fit our own preconceptions. An example of this is an October 1941 intercept in which Tokyo asked the Honolulu consulate for the exact number and location of U.S. warships in the harbor. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark remarked: "We knew the Japanese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been down as just another example of their great attention to detail."[8]

Of course, it was not entirely a failure of intelligence. Operational planning was also at fault. Even if the indicators had been interpreted correctly and the warning disseminated, soldiers would not have had time to assume a defensive posture. A force conducting a surprise attack has the advantage of time. It is not feasible to place troops on constant alert.

Wohlstetter concluded her study of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor with this caution: "We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it."[9]

The War Department general staff began its own study of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. It published its findings in January 1947. Many of its recommendations have been overtaken by changes in MI organization and technology; however, some of their conclusions are still valid.

Findings

The first conclusion cited a lack of appropriations for MI, which is still a problem.

The second conclusion stated, "Intelligence training was not given sufficient weight in the selection of high-level intelligence staff officers." Emphasis was put on operations and command in Army schools, and more prestige was attached to those positions. The study recommended that "through the school system and military intelligence publications, the importance of strategic intelligence and its evaluation by trained personnel be stressed."

The third conclusion was that "at every level there were failures to place sufficient credence in the incomplete intelligence at hand to ensure that within existing capabilities no action was omitted which might improve our security against attack.... Dissemination of intelligence and information from Washington to field was not adequate...to keep the field...informed. Conversely, the field personnel did not at all times forward all the information collected by their commands which would be of interest to the various intelligence agencies in Washington." Security precautions stopped or slowed information flow.

The fourth conclusion found fault with information analysis and dissemination.

> *The principles of the importance of first information and of prompt dissemination of the conditions of first contact were widely overlooked. Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor was widely rumored in Japan at the time, we later learned, it was first proposed by Yamamoto, but the rumors were disregarded as fantastic...no one in a position to act realized that the logical target for initial surprise attack was our fleet at Pearl Harbor.... Finally, when their forces were first contacted at Hawaii, the significance of the contacts was missed until the bombs fell.*

Korea

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Peoples Army swarmed into the Republic of Korea (ROK), supported by armor columns and planes. The North Koreans achieved complete tactical surprise and would nearly overwhelm the peninsula.

The U.S. had a small but organized intelligence-gathering capability in Korea in 1950. The U.S. Army's Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) had officers working with every echelon of the ROK Army. They were able to compile intelligence on the North Korean Army. The KMAG was assigned to the State Department rather than to General Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command (FEC). KMAG information bypassed the FEC and went directly to Washington. Major General Charles Willoughby, the FEC G2, organized the Korean Liaison Office (KLO) to collect information. The KLO was a detachment of intelligence specialists. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul had military attaches and political analysts working on the military situation.

These assets detected plenty of warnings like the evacuation of civilians north of the 38th parallel, troop buildups along the border, and positioning of supplies and equipment in forward areas.

So frequently had the North Koreans raided the border, including two limited invasions of the South, that Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson referred to these incidents as "Sunday morning incursions." In spite of a lull in the frequency of border incursions (another possible indicator), no one thought the existing indicators were out of the ordinary.

Between June 1949 and June 1950, FEC intelligence dispatched 1,200 warnings to Washington of an impending North Korean attack.[10] The Defense Department stated that the ROK Army was far superior to its communist neighbor. This belief lead officials to reject the possibility of a North Korean attack and to believe that, even if an attack occurred, the ROK could defeat the North in two weeks. Analysts failed to evaluate the significance of the massing of T-34 tanks at the border and underestimated their capabilities to negotiate flooded rice paddies.[11]

North Korean leader Kim Il Sung issued a proclamation on June 7, 1950, that elections would be held "Korea-wide" on August 15. This was the first time he had ever boldly asserted a deadline. Like all such statements from the North, it was dismissed as propaganda.[12]

By 1950, the pattern took on increasing significance. Major General Willoughby forwarded reports to Washington in which his analysts stated that a North Korean invasion would take place in the spring. Major General Willoughby nonconcurred, saying, "such an act is unlikely."[13]

In November 1949, the FEC G2 briefed James F. Schnabel on the military situation in Korea. "A major from the G2 section, quite frankly stated that the feeling in G2 was that the North Koreans would attack and conquer South Korea in the coming summer. The point was not emphasized particularly and the fact seemed to be accepted as regrettable but inevitable."[14]

Failure to predict the North Korean invasion in 1950 was a failure of analysis at higher echelons. In March 1950, Major General Willoughby reported:

> *It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer...South Korea is not expected to seriously consider warfare so long as her precipitating war entails probable discontinuance of United States aid. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring and summer is furtherance of attempts to overthrow South Korean government by creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic of Korea through guerrillas and psychological warfare.*[15]

In the same month, the embassy in Seoul told the State Department there was little possibility of a North Korean invasion. In Washington, attention

was focused on Indochina.

No analyses accompanied this raw data. Just six days before the invasion, Major General Willoughby wrote: "Apparently Soviet advisors believe that now is the opportune time to attempt to subjugate the South Korean Government by political means, especially since the guerrilla campaign in South Korea recently has met with serious reverses." [16]

Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified in congressional hearings:

> *Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.*[17]

American officials, however, discounted these intelligence indications partly because of a distrust of their Korean sources. They felt the Koreans were overstating the threat for their own purposes, and that North Korean activity near the border was routine. They were also distracted by Soviet-instigated trouble around the globe.

South Korean officials were ignored when they warned of a North Korean attack because they had said the same thing so often in the past. General Matthew Ridgway wrote that MacArthur's G2 staff did not rate its Asian agents as reliable because "South Koreans especially had a tendency to cry 'wolf' when there was no beast in the offing."[18]

Another reason American leaders did not accept the possibility of a North Korean invasion could have been the psychological specter of evacuating American citizens. There were no plans in place for such a contingency. In fact, the ROK had been written out of the U.S. sphere of influence in a public speech by Dean Acheson.

Two ways to dismiss contradictory information are to question its validity or to simply pretend it doesn't exist. When the American ambassador in Seoul reported a North Korean buildup along the 38th parallel, officials ignored him. Many thought he was justifying his recent request for armor for the ROK Army. No one believed that North Korea had the power to attack the South, unless equipped by the Soviet Union. However, Soviet equipment was left out of the equation, and intelligence reports said only that North Korea did not have adequate resources for an invasion.

To the Army's credit, it looked for lessons in failure. Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, summed up intelligence lessons learned:

> *I believe that there are lessons to be learned from this situation which can point the way to better governmental operations and thus avoid costly mistakes in the future... I recommend that...a clear-cut interagency standing operating procedure be established now to ensure that if (in the opinion of any intelligence agency, particularly CIA) an attack, or other noteworthy event, is impending it is made a matter of special handling, to ensure that officials vitally concerned...are promptly and personally informed thereof in order that appropriate measures may be taken. This will prevent a repetition of the Korean situation and will ensure, if there has been vital intelligence data pointing to an imminent attack, that it will not be buried in a series of routine CIA intelligence reports.*

Tet Offensive

Intelligence had a bad year in 1968. First, a message to the DIA, about the possible North Korean seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship **Pueblo** was lost. Later in the year, the U.S. was taken by surprise when the Soviets, after massing troops on the border for seven weeks, invaded Czechoslovakia. In the same year, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam began.



Tet, a Vietnamese holiday, was a traditional period of cease-fires. On January 31, 1968, communist forces launched a surprise attack against cities and military and government targets throughout the country. A key part of the communist strategy was simultaneous armed insurrection by South Vietnamese citizens. If this succeeded, tens of thousands of the southern populace would join the insurgent forces. Ultimately, the offensive failed.

As a diversion, the North aimed thrusts along the border with South Vietnam, especially at the U.S. base at Khe Sanh. These attacks successfully diverted the allies' attention from the nationwide offensive, but strained North Vietnamese resources.

Documents captured in November 1967 included an order to the People's Army which read: "Use very strong military attacks in coordination with the

uprisings of the local population to take over towns and cities. Troops should flood the lowlands. They should move toward liberating the capital city."[19]

Concentrated attacks on U.S. facilities at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa Air Base, and the logistical complex at Long Binh caused initial confusion but were eventually defeated by the quick response of American combat units. The bloody battle at Hue, where U.S. Marines were desperately engaged, and attacks on government offices in Saigon, including the U.S. Embassy, came as a shock to the anxious American psyche. There seemed to be fighting and destruction everywhere. Television throughout the U.S. compounded this perception. However, by late February, the Viet Cong were withdrawing.

The Viet Cong lost between 40,000 and 50,000 killed in action, and their infrastructure was destroyed. Ironically, Tet was the biggest allied victory of the war. The American political leadership and people saw Tet as proof that we were not winning in Vietnam—that we could be surprised by an enemy most MI experts had counted out.

The Tet Offensive was a turning point in the war. It was a terminal blow to American political will. Subsequently, U.S. policy shifted toward a policy of reduction. Tet was a North Vietnamese success because of surprise. North Vietnamese General Tran Do said after the war, "We did not achieve our main objective.... As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our intention—but it turned out to be a fortunate result."[20]

One of the reasons U.S. analysts were surprised was the irrationality of the plan. The plan was based on the faulty assumption that the southern populace would seize this opportunity to join the communists.

Nevertheless, collection had not failed before Tet. The allies had—

- ☐ A captured order for the offensive.
- ☐ Tape-recorded discussions from agents at Qui Nhon.
- ☐ Prisoner interrogations.
- ☐ An unprecedented number of high priority SIGINT intercepts indicating an attack.
- ☐ Strong evidence provided by premature attacks in I and II Corps tactical zones.

Ephraim Kam assigns three levels of reliability to intelligence information: nonreliable or partly reliable; reliable but controlled (enemy knows we know and can change plans); and reliable noncontrolled (enemy does not know we know). The attack order intercepted several weeks before the offensive was deemed unreliable because it originated outside the upper levels of the communist leadership, did not specify the date of attack, and was mistaken for propaganda.[21]

There were at least four accurate reports of enemy intentions. General Phillip Davidson, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2), briefed General Westmoreland on January 13. He reported that attacks against Saigon were imminent, and General Westmoreland responded by strengthening the city. Allied attention was then drawn to the north by the enemy threat at Khe Sanh. On the morning before the attack, General Davidson predicted that the premature attacks against the cities in I and II Corps foreshadowed similar attacks throughout the country within 24 hours.

Westmoreland heeded this warning but it was too late to change defensive dispositions. The warning itself did not seem extraordinary; most commanders routinely received information from MACV headquarters. Since the troops were on alert at least half of the time, the alert at 11:25 a.m., January 30, seemed routine. The North Vietnamese were able to achieve surprise.

U.S. intelligence was credited with a failure because analysts did not put all the pieces together until hours before the Tet Offensive.

James Wirtz analyzes this failure in light of six empirical questions. "Were the Americans surprised because they failed to—

- ☐ Identify the adversary?
- ☐ Estimate the probability of attack?
- ☐ Determine the type of action involved?
- ☐ Identify the location of the attack?
- ☐ Predict the time of the attack?
- ☐ Determine the motivation behind the initiative?"[22]

During wartime, the question of identifying the adversary becomes moot; it is also likely that an attack will take place. So analysts assumed that a major offensive was expected. The type of action involved was also easy to predict since the North had no assets to launch an air, amphibious, naval, airborne, or nuclear attack. Ground troops would conduct the attack. The analysis failure occurred in where, when, and why.

U.S. leaders had two choices where the enemy offensive would occur—urban areas or along the DMZ. One of the reasons they chose the DMZ was because it coincided with their analogies to Dien-Bien Phu. U.S. commanders also saw their troops as the biggest threat to the enemy. Because U.S. forces were well-prepared around Khe Sanh, they would have preferred the attack there. These beliefs were reinforced by SIGINT that indicated a massing of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops along the borders.[23] The predispositions of U.S. leaders

caused them to mistake the diversion for the main attack and the main attack for the diversion.

Since U.S. analysts thought in terms of U.S. troops rather than their Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) allies, they failed to correctly predict the date of the offensive. During Tet, half of the ARVN soldiers would be on leave, an excellent time to attack ARVN areas of responsibility. U.S. analysts believed the South Vietnamese army was protected by the American shield along the DMZ. In the past, the North had taken advantage of truces to resupply and build up their forces. Analysts wrongly believed the attack would fall after the truce.



Motivation for the communist offensive was to reverse their declining combat readiness and morale. U.S. analysts correctly viewed the enemy offensive as a "last ditch" effort, similar to the German's offensive at the "Battle of the Bulge." They did not recognize the further objective of deceiving U.S. forces and attacking vulnerable ARVN units.

Historians have suggested that Army intelligence analysts produced reports that the enemy was defeated to confirm the views of their leaders and the Johnson administration.

Wirtz sums up his insightful analysis of Tet and its meaning for intelligence operations this way:

> *The story of the intelligence failure also highlights the herculean task faced by officers, analysts, and policy makers as they strove to complete the intelligence cycle. Remarkably, the Americans almost succeeded in anticipating their opponents' moves in time to avoid the military consequences of surprise, despite their underestimation of the weakness in their alliance, the resourcefulness of their opponents, and the handicaps they faced in completing the intelligence cycle. But two factors ultimately slowed them in their race to predict the future: the influence of beliefs that could no longer account for events, and their inability to anticipate the mistakes made by their opponents.*

Causes of Intelligence Failures

There are many ways for intelligence to fail, and things usually go wrong in combination. There are many critical nodes in the process, and there are many blocks in the minds of the evaluators. Errors occur because—

- ☐ There is not enough data resulting from a failure to target an area.
- ☐ There is too much data, sometimes caused by enemy misinformation, that slows the information flow. In this case it is important to assign the proper priority.
- ☐ There is conflicting data. Often the reliability of sources is questioned.
- ☐ Mistakes can be made about the urgency of the data.
- ☐ Human inaction often plays a part.
- ☐ The repetition of indicators causes the "cry wolf" syndrome, which causes evaluators to discount signs that appear common.
- ☐ Information is withheld from decision makers by an overzealous staff officer attempting to protect his boss from adverse information.

In addition, there are errors in judgment. Rarely do MI professionals err on the side of enemy capabilities. It is in predicting enemy intentions that errors multiply. As historians and intelligence officers, we need to understand the psychology of human response to information that shapes the decision process. Policy makers often sift information through their own preconceptions. People believe what they have been conditioned to believe, predicting the future based on their own biases. Harry Truman was unwilling to believe that the North Koreans would do anything as irrational as cross an interna-

(Continued on page 40)

Intelligence Targeting in KOREA

by Lieutenant Colonel John Phillips

The challenge: for the divisional MI battalion to provide timely and accurate intelligence to support divisional maneuver and fire support targeting. The 2d Infantry Division's 102d MI Battalion has accepted this challenge. It is using signals collection and ground surveillance operations to maximize MI support to divisional targeting.

MI operations in the 2d ID area of operations appear overwhelming at first glance. The mountainous terrain restricts long distance observation and radio line of sight (that usually ends at the next ridge line). Land navigation, while enhanced by distinctive terrain features in daylight, is often confusing at night. Rice paddies in most mobility corridors are either flooded or caked in mud much of the year. This severely limits cross-country movement and restricts mechanized forces, including most Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) assets, to improved roads and rocky terrain.

The 102d's initial battle is to occupy the high ground. Our competitors are U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) signal assets, maneuver observation posts, and air defense positions. Extensive reforestation greatly restricts access to dominant terrain and limits many of our IEW assets to hilltops with roads.

Given these terrain restraints, the use of digital terrain analysis software is extremely beneficial when planning signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection baselines. This software helps in selecting collection sites that provide maximum SIGINT coverage. These sites should also provide lateral radio line of sight between collection assets which are designed to net during direction finding (DF) operations. To cover this challenging terrain, we need as many ground based collection teams as possible.

Low Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) was used extensively during the Korean War. It is still widely used in Korea and provides valuable, real-time intelligence to the combat commander. A five-person PRD-11 team and a two-person analysis element helps the maneuver commander anticipate enemy actions through voice intercept and limited DF capabilities.

LLVI is suited to SIGINT targeting in Korea for three reasons. First, LLVI can deploy to locations inaccessible to other DF systems. Second, during recent training the information flow from an LLVI team through the task force command post to an infantry squad was less than 15 minutes. This timely flow of intelligence is especially valuable during counterreconnaissance. Finally, a forward deployed PRD-11 team can net with other SIGINT assets like the AN/TRQ-32 TEAMMATE or AN/TSQ-138 TRAILBLAZER to help acquire accurate locations of enemy emitters.

Another element of the ground based SIGINT architecture is the MI liaison to maneuver units. Three brigade IEW staff officers (IEWSOs) monitor SIGINT reporting nets between collection assets and the technical control and analysis element (TCAE). Their role is to identify close fire support targets. They quickly focus general enemy locations into a target by quick intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The IEWSO passes possible direct support artillery targets to the brigade fire support officer (FSO).

The TCAE also passes enemy locations over a

QUICKFIRE communications link to the DIVARTY targeting section to support fire support operations. A target with a large circular error of probability can help DIVARTY identify high value targets or can cross-cue other intelligence collectors to help refine locations. The DIVARTY commander credited this link with identifying general to specific locations of high value artillery units to support counterfire during the 2nd ID Battle Command Training Program in 1992. This intelligence with refined location data from countermortar and counterbattery radars was invaluable.

Our battalion combined a TRAILBLAZER traffic analysis team with a forward TCAE. This cell was collocated with DIVARTY in a further attempt to reduce the time between collection and reporting. This SIGINT targeting cell is potentially the fastest link into DIVARTY for both the close and deep battle. Netted TRAILBLAZER and AN/ALQ-151 QUICKFIX assets provide the battalion's most robust DF capability.

These aspects of the intelligence targeting cycle depend on accurate locations and consistent communications. The introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS) into our battalion in 1991 provided a new method to improve intelligence accuracy and better sustain communications.

The primary benefit of GPS is the locational accuracy. At night, even the best navigator can become disoriented as terrain features disappear. This is a challenge for ground surveillance radar and remote sensor platoon leaders, in particular, since they must ensure accurate coverage of named areas of interest (NAIs). A reconnaissance of the NAI using GPS positively identifies the proper NAI and ensures the confidence of the maneuver commanders. The GPS is also used to record the emplacement of sensors and signal relays between the remote sensors and sensor monitors. Later the GPS aids in their retrieval.

Does the precise emplacement of collection antennas and "registering" those antennas improve DF accuracy? There are at least three good reasons to follow these procedures using GPS. First, precise asset locations are crucial to battlefield terrain management, especially due to the competition for friendly hilltop locations. Second, precise collection antenna emplacement and registration reduce the circular error of probability during DF calculations. Finally, these techniques increase the confidence of maneuver and fire support units in our targeting efforts.

The platoon leader identifies the collection antenna location when emplacing assets using the GPS. Additionally, each asset registers its antennas by taking a line of bearing to the platoon leader's radio or company operations center's radio using single channel communications. Both locations were located using the GPS. Thus, operators can compensate for slight calibration errors the same way azimuths are adjusted using a map's declination diagram.

The GPS is also beneficial for DF training against a "radio OPFOR." We array a SIGINT baseline against our soldiers who transmit from GPS-located positions on the "battlefield." The OPFOR follows a precise transmission schedule moving from one GPS confirmed location to another. We usually employ five to eight vehicle-mounted teams for this training. We conduct an after action review (AAR) after four to six hours of training.

The AAR focuses on both the collection assets' performance and the TCAE's targeting performance. First, the S3 reveals the OPFOR transmission schedule to assess the accuracy of the TCAE's targets. Second, the TCAE compares the accuracy of asset DF against ground truth. Third, the asset operators and TCAE attempt to isolate the cause of inaccuracies.

This methodology reinforces TCAE analyst and asset operator confidence in their skills and teamwork. Over the course of two or three consecutive training events, the soldiers take pride in improved accuracy. This occurs even among teams affected by the rapid personnel turnover inherent in Korea short tours. The use of GPS as a training enhancement contributes to the improved accuracy.

Finally, our battalion was able to improve SINCGARS (single channel ground airborne radio system) FM frequency-hopping communications. We did this by adopting a "GPS time is SINCGARS time" policy. Thus, our constant challenge to keep frequency-hopping radios in time synchronization improved when the net control station maintained GPS time as the master station. This greatly improved the reliability of communications in the unit.

In summary, these collection enhancement techniques and training methods increased our ability to quickly and accurately locate targets in support of combat operations. Most of these innovations were developed by our soldiers and junior leaders. I believe these procedures maximize the capability of heavy MI battalion assets within today's force structure. Yes, we can meet the targeting challenge.

LTC Phillips is assigned to the Center for Army Tactics, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has served in many operational, command, and intelligence assignments including S3, 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Just Cause; and Commander, 102d MI Battalion, 2d Infantry Division.

Light Infantry Battalion Commander, S2, and Scout Platoon Leader

by Lieutenant Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry

On tomorrow's battlefield, tactical reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) will become more complex because of increasingly diverse and sophisticated collection assets. Tactical R&S may be further complicated (and is, by design, at the Combat Training Centers [CTCs]) by time constraints and vaguely defined objectives. These complications will make it extremely difficult to focus resources. (R&S doctrine is defined in **FM 34-2-1, TTP for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance.**)

A light infantry battalion, with its limited personnel, relative immobility, and modest communications capabilities, has little margin for error. However, there are two ways to increase the probability of success. We must—

- ☐ Recognize the vital roles the battalion commander, S2, and scout platoon leader perform in infantry intelligence operations.
- ☐ Examine how these relationships affect the outcome.

The roles of the commander, S2, and scout platoon leader are defined in **FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion**:

- ☐ The commander owns the battalion intelligence system; is responsible for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); is responsible for the R&S process; and shapes and approves the R&S plan.
- ☐ The S2 conducts IPB, along with the commander, S3, and other staff members; helps the commander develop priority intelligence requirements; prepares and disseminates intelligence estimates; plans battalion patrols, intelligence collection, and R&S; and supervises intelligence training.
- ☐ The scout platoon leader advises the commander and S2 on the use of the scout platoon, and conducts tactical reconnaissance in support of the battalion.

How can we enhance the effectiveness of each of these key participants in the light infantry battalion's intelligence operating system? To answer this, we must first address the issue of "legitimacy crisis" in the light infantry battalion. Remember, the system is synergistic and the participants do not act in isolation.

A Legitimacy Crisis

In the light infantry battalion, the S2 and scout platoon leader often face a "legitimacy crises." Failure to address this problem is equivalent to ignoring the unit's intelligence operating system. What is a legitimacy crisis? This occurs when the S2 and scout platoon leader do not have the power necessary to perform effectively. On the "prestige scale," the S2 is usually somewhere below the S3, S4, and company commanders. Consequently, the S2 does not have the clout to advance his own agenda.

The scout platoon leader is even at a greater disadvantage. He is often a junior officer whose judgment and actions decide the outcome of R&S.

To compound the problem, the battalion commander may use the S2 exclusively for physical security, crime prevention, and key control pro-

grams—unless facing a CTC rotation or external evaluation (EXTEV). Even worse, the battalion commander may use the S2 as a backstop for lower priority projects that don't fit into the S1, S3, or S4 job descriptions. In this environment, the scout platoon leader alternates between conducting non-METL related training and high visibility demonstrations. Without the commander's intervention, our peacetime intelligence operating system is unsatisfactory.

Let's look at what the commander, S2, and scout platoon leader can do to maintain "legitimacy" and battle focus in intelligence operations. Here are some techniques relating to training, tactics, and leadership that may help solve the problem.

Training

To plan and conduct realistic S2 section and scout platoon training is more difficult than it appears. CTC rotations and battalion EXTEVs are the only events that seem to warrant all of the resources necessary to conduct training to standard. Critical training resources include logical scenarios, a competitive OPFOR, and professional observer-controllers (OCs). How can we sustain S2 section and scout proficiency when rotations and evaluations occur infrequently?

1. The S2 must help plan and conduct scout training, work with the headquarters company commander to ensure the accuracy of the scout platoon leader's training assessment, and help focus the platoon's training plans.

2. The S2 should plan and conduct scout EXTEVs quarterly, alternating between squad and platoon levels. He should conduct 24-hour squad EXTEVs over a three-day period with squads rotating daily as friendly forces, OPFOR, and support elements. The pool of OCs includes: scout platoon leader and sergeant; HHC commander, executive officer (XO), and first sergeant; and the commanders and executive officers from the rifle companies. OCs should habitually observe a squad.

3. The S2 must make sure adequate resources are available to support squad EXTEVs. These evaluations should include the most difficult scout tasks: navigation, pinpointing the objective, reconnaissance, communications maintenance, linkup, and the back-brief.

4. The S2 should conduct sophisticated platoon EXTEVs over a three-day period. The most difficult problem is to devise realistic objectives. One solution is for the S2 to monitor the division's long-range planning calendar. He can identify when the aviation brigade, division artillery, division support command, and separate battalion units conduct field training. Usually, these units welcome a security test by a

"benign" OPFOR. The scouts are benign because they will not disrupt the unit since their mission is to avoid combat.

An aggressive S2 can usually close the deal if he is sensitive to the other unit's concerns about safety and terrain management. The S2 must also provide feedback to the unit commander and his staff on the results of scout operations. This, in turn, serves as an assessment of that unit's OPSEC. The scout platoon EXTEV should be a major training event that replicates reconnaissance guidance and planning in the battalion's tactical SOP.

5. To achieve realism, the S2 should command and control from a deployed battalion TOC operated by the S2 section, part of the S3 section, the fire support element, and a communications section. The HHC XO provides logistical support as in all tactical operations.

6. The signal officer (SIGO) should help structure communications problems that include operations at extended ranges and jamming.

For EXTEVs, the division of responsibilities within the staff and between the S2 and the HHC commander varies according to the experience, capabilities, and work loads of the participants. However, the S2 must be in a leading position. To ensure his section is not excluded from the tactical collection process, the S2 should have a sense of **ownership** of the final product. By working together, the S2 and scout platoon leader can communicate implicitly—an absolute necessity for success in battalion intelligence operations.

Finally, when battalion leaders see the commander's participation, they will "get the message." They will know that the S2 is more than the physi-

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cal security and weather guy," and the scout platoon leader is more than the "pushup champion."

Following are three other observations about the training connection between the S2 and scout platoon:

- ☐ The S2 should always attend portions of the battalion quarterly training briefing and weekly training meetings that cover scout platoon activities.
- ☐ The S2 needs to know that light infantry draws strength from "soldier power." Cohesiveness is the major component of "soldier power." The S2 and his section should visit the scout platoon during training to develop a closer relationship with the platoon.
- ☐ The S2 should be an advocate of expanded training opportunities for both the platoon and his own section because the S2 has more access to resources than the scout platoon leader.

The battalion commander can expand the prestige of the S2 and his section by emphasizing intelligence operations during staff training exercises. The commander must insist on adherence to the intelligence operations doctrine in **FM 7-20**, and **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.** Simultaneously, the rest of the staff is forced (as a captive audience) to consider IPB and R&S as important functions.

Tactics

Perhaps the most difficult problem the commander, S2, and scout platoon leader face in battalion intelligence operations is planning and executing an effective reconnaissance plan. The scout platoon leader often finds himself planning in isolation. Initially, the commander and S3 focus on mission analysis and initial staff guidance, while the S2 focuses on the IPB process. Before crossing the line of departure (LD), the battalion's primary focus is the R&S plan; until LD time, the scout platoon represents the main effort.

It is imperative that we establish SOPs that ensure reconnaissance activities support the commander's intent and fully coordinate intelligence procedures among the battle staff. We can accomplish this when we make sure the "commander's reconnaissance guidance" and the "scout platoon leader back-brief" are part of our battalion troop-leading procedures. The S2 should be the staff proponent for these procedures.

Reconnaissance guidance allows the commander to scrutinize the R&S concept and the scout platoon leader's mission. It gives the commander an opportunity to clarify his concept of R&S activities and to define bottom-line success to the S2 and scout platoon leader. The commander should issue his guidance after he receives the brigade's warning, operations, or fragmentary orders. This should be a 15-minute briefing, attended by the S2, S3, fire support officer, SIGO, scout platoon leader, and HHC executive officer. The commander should present his reconnaissance guidance to the S2 and scout platoon leader in a prescribed format at the TOC. (See Table 1.)

The S2 can help prepare the guidance briefing, but the commander should present it himself. The battle staff should attend the briefing. At this time, the commander should clarify the support he expects the S2 and scout platoon leader to receive as they prepare the battalion R&S plan. This also gives the S2 and scout platoon leader a forum to seek clarification and assistance from the commander and other battle staff members.

The scout platoon leader back-brief allows the commander to refine and approve the scout platoon leader's concept of operations. After the S2 and other battle staff members coordinate their plans with the scout platoon leader, he presents his back-brief in the TOC. The same personnel that attended the commander's guidance session should attend the back-brief. Additional staff officers may need to attend, such as a USAF Tactical Air Control Party member or the Air Liaison Officer (ALO). The back-brief should not take more than 20 minutes and should be conducted in an established format. (See Table 2.)

Reconnaissance guidance and back-brief sessions should encourage personnel to look for gaps and to voice their concerns. They provide the appropriate concentration of staff resources necessary for the S2 and scout platoon leader to develop a successful R&S plan.

Some additional tactical techniques to improve light infantry battalion intelligence operations include:

- ☐ The S2 must develop a healthy sense of responsibility for the scouts.
- ☐ The HHC XO should maintain a support platoon HMMWV to transport and resupply the scout platoon.
- ☐ The battalion TOC should keep a radio for immediate backup use. All scout radios should use secure communications.
- ☐ The S2 must ensure the leadership does not overlook scout and R&S activities.
- ☐ The S2 must provide company commanders with a final "intelligence dump" as close to LD time as possible.

Leadership

Beyond training and tactics, the battalion commander must drive his intelligence operating system. Initially, he must ensure the command sergeant major assigns his best people to the S2 section and scout platoon. He needs to set up a direct line through which the HHC commander, first sergeant, scout platoon sergeant, and S2 can talk to the command sergeant major about personnel. The commander cannot allow his S2 section to become a transition point for infantry soldiers on profile. If he allows this to happen, he will send the wrong message to the battalion about his priorities.

The scout platoon is the model for the battalion. As such, scouts must maintain the highest standards in soldier skills, discipline, and physical fitness. Scouts should be the best light infantry soldiers, whether on patrol or conducting drill and ceremony. This is critical because it feeds "the winner's mindset" that a scout must develop to succeed. Company commanders will respect the scouts more, and this will enhance the scout platoon leader's effectiveness.





Just as the S3 has direct access to the commander on training and operational matters, the battalion commander must have direct access to the S2 and scout platoon leader on intelligence matters. However, this does not relegate the battalion XO and HHC commander to the sidelines on intelligence matters. It requires the commander to shape his intelligence operating system and to build a system that is cohesive and responsive to his style.

While our Army doctrine emphasizes the importance of tactical intelligence operations, light infantry battalions often fail to reach that goal. Nevertheless, success can be achieved by a battalion commander, S2, and scout platoon leader who recognize the dynamics of the intelligence operating system and then apply training, tactical, and leadership solutions.

LTC Eikenberry is a National Security Fellow with the JFK School of Government at Harvard. He commanded and served in staff positions in the U.S., Korea, and Europe, and served as assistant Army Attache in Beijing. LTC Eikenberry is a graduate of USMA and holds a master's degree from Harvard. His articles have appeared in **Infantry, Military Review, Parameters,** and **Military History.**

IMAGERY PRODUCTION: SUPPORTING TACTICAL COMMANDERS



by Captain James A. Hamby

The Scout Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, conducts precombat equipment inspections before a 3 a.m. reconnaissance and surveillance insertion. They check communications equipment, food, and water; back-brief the plan; and conduct a final check of their 35-mm cameras with telescopic lenses. On this mission, the scouts will—

- ☐ Collect valuable combat information on film.
- ☐ Confirm or deny enemy activity at designated named areas of interest (NAIs).
- ☐ Photograph six-wheeled OPFOR vehicles they were unable to positively identify.

What good is photography to an infantry battalion that does not have an organic development capability? Before the Polaroid Autoprocessor, the answer to that question would have been "very little." However, in this scenario, an S2 representative meets the extraction UH-60 at the TOC, collects the film, and immediately takes the film to the Polaroid Autoprocessor for development.

The Polaroid Autoprocessor is an invaluable piece of equipment. The film is loaded into the processor—a self-contained, simple-to-operate device—without the need to mix messy chemicals or to provide temperature-regulated storage.

In two minutes, the 36-exposure, 35-mm, color slide film is developed. The slides are then cut and mounted for use. The entire process takes only 20 minutes from the time the roll is put into the processor until the consumer has 36 usable color slides that provide timely and useful information. Incidentally, the six-wheeled vehicles were identified as LAV-25's with thermal sights, a 25-mm stabilized main gun, and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun.

During Exercise Ocean Venture '92, this type of critical information was disseminated in slide form to infantry company commanders four hours before H-Hour. All the equipment needed to use this valuable intelligence is an additional small tent, the TOC generator, and a slide projector. The equipment was emplaced in a make-shift darkroom.

In an air assault infantry battalion, the size and weight of equipment is critical because of the speed, range, and flexibility of air assault missions. The processor is ideal because it only weighs two pounds and its associated equipment fits into a shoebox.

The processor works! When properly used, it provides the battalion with near-real-time imagery that is collected, developed, processed, and disseminated internally. Our assistant division commander for operations has recognized the processor as a highly useful tactical intelligence tool. He has directed that all infantry battalion S2 sections use it.

If you want the same capability, the Polaroid Autoprocessor is available through local purchase from a photography store. As of yet, it is not in the Army inventory.

CPT Hamby is a graduate of Florida State University, where he also was commissioned. He has been a platoon leader, XO, aide de camp, and battalion S2. CPT Hamby is currently the S2, 1/502d Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, KY.

HOW TO GET THE MOST OUT OF YOUR TERRAIN BOARD

by Captain Mark A. Farrar

Editor's Note: In this article a terrain board (model) is a relatively small piece of ground that is prepared to represent a geographical area where an operation will be conducted. The terrain board is an important rehearsal tool. The terrain model rehearsal is discussed in depth in the final draft of ***FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff****, August 1993.*

Some of the terrain board techniques the 3d (Greywolf) Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division devised proved to be quite successful. The 3d Brigade had the opportunity to experiment on three distinctive types of terrain (Texas, California, and Kuwait) and under varying time and mission constraints.

The S2's Opportunity to Excel

In some units the terrain board is a joint project shared between elements of the staff. Usually, no one is in charge and confusion is the rule rather than the exception. This is a great opportunity for the S2 section to take charge. Giving the terrain board to the S2 section hands the project to the terrain experts, the section that is most attentive to terrain details, and the section that is least likely to be interrupted during the orders process. This does not mean the S2 section does everything; however, they should execute the most critical projects. These tasks include:

- ☐ Select the site.
- ☐ Select the size (based on the commander's guidance).
- ☐ Determine the scale.
- ☐ Construct significant terrain features.
- ☐ Mark and label grids.
- ☐ Build and label features of OCOKA—observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,

obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach; and mobility corridors.

- ☐ Mark all enemy graphics.

Aggressive S3 sections may have problems with this arrangement. Our experience indicates, however, the more pressure we can take off the S3 section, the better they can do their job.

Taking Charge—The Construction Time Line

The first step in terrain board leadership is to organize the work effort—who works on the terrain board and in what order. For example, an oral order to the staff sections might sound like this: "The basic terrain board will be built betwen 1000 and 1300. The terrain board will be ready for blue graphics at 1300. Engineers and fire support can add their graphics from 1330 to 1400. All remaining sections can add their graphics from 1400 to 1430. After 1430, all sections need to stand by for quality checks and the XO's final walk-through."

Material

What is more annoying than the inability to read blurred 3 by 5 cards during a rehearsal after a rain storm? How often has the wind blown parts of a terrain board away? Prior planning and investing the necessary time and equipment in a terrain board kit will prevent these problems.

Our brigade developed a constantly growing terrain board kit. All contents must pass the "will it work if it is wet" test. Instead of 3 by 5 cards (for grid markers), we cut hundreds of 4 by 4-inch plexiglass squares and added stick-on numbers. These are reusable, sturdy, and heavy so that they will not blow away. Our friendly (blue) and enemy (red) symbols (objectives, routes of march, coordination points, etc.) were made of thin plywood (also reusable). We used 3/8-inch diameter nylon rope instead of yarn for phaselines (red, blue, yellow, and green). Rope is reusable, can be nailed to the ground, and remains in place when people walk on it. The rope can be secured using 6-inch bridge spikes. This rope has the added advantage of being clearly visible from a distance.

Size

No two operations are the same, so every terrain board should be different. Size terrain boards according to the mission and the audience. A large, detailed terrain board is required for a deliberate attack against a prepared defense. Conversely, a movement to contact board does not require detail for any particular piece of terrain, but needs to cover the entire area of operations. We constructed three terrain boards for one NTC mission:

- ☐ One to rehearse movement to the objective.
- ☐ Another for the objective itself.
- ☐ A third to rehearse the follow-on mission.

Quality Control

Most of our terrain products adhere to the 10-foot rule. The rule states that "if you cannot recognize or read the item at 10 feet, it is probably too small." This rule includes everything from marking phase lines to sizing the board. Part of terrain board quality control is checking everything that goes on the board.

Detail

The more time you spend on details, the more valuable the board is to commanders. You should carry an abundant supply of red and blue blocks,

and model vehicles to continuously update the board, right up to rehearsal time. Our section never received criticism for this method, even when we had to delay the rehearsal momentarily.

Execution

Our terrain board SOP gives the S2 the first five minutes of an hour rehearsal. In five minutes the S2 must brief the terrain, weather, and enemy courses of action. If this sounds like a lot of information in a short amount of time, you would be surprised. Filling five minutes with **crucial** versus **nice-to-know** intelligence requires effort. I have seen S2s who present intelligence dissertations, but this is not appropriate for terrain board rehearsals. Commanders appreciate simple, significant information. For example, tell the commander that "these are the three pieces of key terrain," as opposed to a lengthy briefing on the effects of different degrees of slope in the area of operations.

You can give a great briefing or you can put people to sleep in five minutes (especially at the NTC). I have developed some five-minute briefing rules:

- ☐ Maintain eye contact.
- ☐ Memorize your briefing.
- ☐ Present the material so that even someone who is half-asleep remembers the key points.
- ☐ Brief in front of an audience if possible. You should use your section, because participation makes your soldiers feel important and makes the briefing more interesting.

The stereotypical intelligence briefing that most maneuver arms personnel expect involves a meek voiced S2 reading his briefing from a bent 3 by 5 card. Avoid the stereotype; tailor the briefing to the fatigue level of the audience.

Point to key terrain, pick things up, talk from the enemy perspective, and move around the terrain board. Resist the temptation to remain stationary. I once had to brief a detailed description of an advanced guard attack in the middle of a rain storm. It was obvious I was quickly losing the crowd's attention 30 seconds into the briefing. I dropped into the mud in desperation, moved clods of earth to represent echelons, and threw mud to simulate artillery. I knew I had regained their attention in spite of the laughter.

Later, we used a similar technique at the NTC. This time, instead of pushing mud, we pulled plywood arrows to represent echelons. Each arrow had a string attached to the point. We also used model helicopters, while the assistants made helicopter sound effects, to show probable enemy air insertions.

You could call this a "children's theater" approach to intelligence. However, you should remember that your audience is in perpetual exhaustion at the NTC. Since there are times where this style is not appropriate, the S2 should decide when to use this technique. To those who question the utility of this technique, I submit that the intelligence community needs to maintain its "creative edge."

Practical Experience In Kuwait

The brigade received an interesting challenge while deployed in Kuwait. The brigade was ordered to build the Kuwaitis a terrain board kit, teach them how to build a terrain board, and coach them on the effective conduct of a rehearsal. This was an important mission. The training would culminate in an actual rehearsal. This particular rehearsal was the beginning of a major coalition command post exercise designed to set new standards for future exercises.

We decided to make a large terrain board (40 by 80 feet) because of the size of the crowd (100 to 200 people). The staff soon nicknamed it "the mother of all terrain boards." A week before the actual rehearsal, we constructed the plywood symbology, both friendly and enemy, to represent every major action. The enemy graphics were based on Soviet symbology; coalition graphics were based on U.S. graphics. Every piece was labeled in Arabic to avoid confusion. We made unit flags (mounted on steel reinforcing rods), bilingual grid markers, and enough vehicle symbols to replicate all of each unit's vehicles if necessary. Finally, we made a bilingual legend. We were careful to use an Arabic map on the legend.

Working with the Kuwaitis

The great terrain board exercise was scheduled over two days. Day one was a training day and day two was a quality check and rehearsal day.

On the morning of day one, we arrived at the 6th Brigade Camp with a truckload of plywood and several miles of rope, twine, and engineer tape. We planned to create this board on an unused soccer field next to brigade headquarters. The brigade commander was the first problem. When he saw all the stakes and plywood, he assumed we were building something other than a terrain board. He promptly asked us to leave. His objections quickly disappeared when we explained that this was only temporary and that the Kuwaiti Chief of Staff was coming to observe the terrain board.

We began to think we had been abandoned after working that morning. Suddenly, a huge convoy of vans filled with eager Kuwaiti lieutenants arrived. After I explained the intent and answered many ques-

(Continued on page 44)

VIEWPOINT: "Peacetime Engagement" and Special Operations Forces



by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Adolph Jr.

For over a dacade, the debate over possible American responses to Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in the Third World has continued. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not developed a strategy for addressing the problem. One official in government has attempted to articulate a concept. James R. Locher III, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, has developed a strategy known as "Peacetime Engagement."

Mr. Locher's concept for Peacetime Engagement in the Third World calls for the proactive use of the military, along with other organs of government. The purpose is to promote democracy in the Third World and to defeat low-intensity conflict threats. The strategy has two phases:

- ☐ To Counteract Violence.
- ☐ To Conduct Nation-Building.

Such a policy, if fully implemented, would create unique challenges for the intelligence community. Currently, the Army Intelligence force structure correctly concentrates most of its assets, personnel, and equipment on potential conventional warfare. These issues should be reviewed and discussed.

Peacetime Engagement has great potential, but may never become a reality. OOTW requires decidedly unconventional responses—something the U.S. has never done well.

The U.S. is the only remaining global power since the demise of the Soviet Union. Never in our collective history has there been a similar situation. "What next?" is not only a troublesome question of American foreign policy but it is also a unique opportunity for the U.S. to occupy the moral high ground—a position America always desires.

The Moral High Ground

This high ground is in concert with the American belief that "liberty and justice for all" means a great deal more than just words recited during the Pledge of Allegiance. In a new strategic environment, the U.S. is the world's moral leader, possibly by default. American diplomatic decisions in the new century will shape what is now called the new world order.

During the Cold War period, the U.S. often failed to put its best foot forward in the Third World. America sometimes supported dictators such as Somoza in Nicaragua, because successive presidential administrations believed communism was the greatest evil. American presidents, and congresses, knew that Somoza was a dictator, but looked the other way because he claimed to be anticommunist. In fact, it was normal to associate with anticommunist dictators, especially in Latin America. Thus, U.S. policy in Latin America and other regions made enemies. Too often, high sounding American ideals did not match our actions.

Peoples in the Third World did not like to see themselves as pawns in the larger bipolar struggle between America and the Soviet Union. Their concerns were, and continue to be, predominantly internal and regional. While America and her allies dealt with the greater evil of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, smaller evils multiplied and prospered. Idi Amin ruled in Uganda, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as well as other dictators throughout the world. America could not simultaneously address these dictators and maintain its enormous commitment to NATO. Consequently, most Third World dictators have gone unchecked up until now.

I do not mean to suggest that America immediately embark on an international military campaign to eradicate the world of its dictators. However, fostering democracy continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. policy, and the military is one component of national power. Diplomacy and economic sanctions failed to convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait so military power was used against him.

A Strategy

How would Assistant Secretary Locher's Peacetime Engagement strategy halt aggression and foster democracy in the Third World? How would our

nation's intelligence organizations change to support this policy? Should intelligence focus on HUMINT now that there is no major conventional military threat? Unfortunately, national collection systems often fail to meet the needs of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and provide the kinds of intelligence required.

National, operational, and tactical intelligence collection systems and personnel are usually unable to answer questions dealing with the intentions of potential antagonists. Cultural and regional data, which are essential to successful SOF operations, are often missing. Specific and detailed information about military capabilities of smaller Third World nations, where SOF commonly deploy, is inadequate. We need to undertake a major effort to refocus our intelligence assets to provide this information. Expanding our HUMINT capabilities appears to make sense.

The potential for Peacetime Engagement, properly supported by our intelligence community, may be significant. Although the concept was born in the defense establishment, I believe it should grow to embrace not only DOD but also the State Department. The Lead Agency Concept places the State Department squarely at the head of any American effort to foster democracy and security in the Third World. All branches of the armed services are potential players.

The importance of SOF in this environment is a given to many who study OOTW. SOF provide a capability that primarily applies to unconventional environments. Congress' creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command is proof of the spread of this concept. Unfortunately, Congress only addressed half of the problem.

The 1986 Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, sponsored by the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, stated this concerning America's handling of OOTW:

> *Second only to our lack of understanding is our lack of unity in responding to the threats to our interests.... Therefore, we must counter ideas with ideas, force with force, diplomacy with diplomacy, and all must flow from a strategy implemented through a strong national unity of effort...at the national level and on a regional basis, unity is lacking. Without national direction it is futile to expect unity of effort.... A strong, synchronized civil-military effort is essential. The debilitating results of its absence are far reaching.... A comprehensive civil-military strategy must be developed to defend our interests threatened by the series of low-intensity conflicts around the globe.... It (the strategy) must integrate all the national resources at our disposal, military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal.*
>
> *Successful operations and activities have been conducted by the United States in various low-intensity conflicts. However, these limited successes are primarily the result of dedicated individuals and organizations achieving success not because of, but in spite of, the absence of a clearly defined low-intensity conflict strategy.*

If the project's report is correct, the problem may be worse now than when this report was written. Then, America had a very real threat, the Soviet Union. It has been seven years since the report, and the U.S. still has no comprehensive strategy for addressing OOTW; and no strategy is on the horizon. Based on my research, Peacetime Engagement is the only governmental attempt to put forth a strategy for dealing with OOTW threats.

The Military Role

Peacetime Engagement suggests a possible answer. Why the emphasis on SOF when other elements of national military power are available? SOF are the only American military forces trained to habitually operate in OOTW. SOF are best equipped to execute Peacetime Engagement because of language and cross-cultural training; extensive experience in hazardous regions; their skill as trainers; and their comparative seniority in rank, maturity, and experience.

Another question is: Why does Peacetime Engagement put emphasis on military operations as opposed to the many civilian agencies under the direction of the State Department? A quick look at the governments of the Third World shows that a majority are either directly controlled or inordinately influenced by their militaries. The military in the Third World is often the power broker.

A preponderance of Third World national leaders at one time wore uniforms. Many still prefer to wear their uniforms. Military-to-military contact is potentially the best way to influence a militaristic national government moving towards establishing a democracy.

Additionally, foreign service officers at the State Department are sometimes unable to successfully deal with military-led or influenced governments because of lack of training and experience. Often security problems, such as terrorism or insurgency, cause Third World governments to seek American military advice and assistance. These kinds of security problems are usually low-technology and human resource intensive, both of which are SOF strengths. The sale of a squadron of F-16's cannot solve the problems that led to an insurgency; how-

ever, the employment of SOF, supporting and in concert with other American foreign policy organizations can.

One only needs to glance at newspaper headlines to realize that the former Soviet Union is in serious trouble. National impulses and ethnic animosities, suppressed for years by Soviet arms, have come to life with a vengeance. Based on current U.S. policies concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Clinton Administration is attempting to stabilize President Yeltsin's regime. No one knows what will happen there. The possibility exists that should the former Soviet Republics fragment further or civil war ensues, the U.S. could become involved militarily.

In Summary

I believe the goals of a national Peacetime Engagement strategy would benefit the U.S. Despite my focus on the role of SOF in OOTW and the importance of intelligence, we must remember that all the organs of U.S. foreign policy must be synchronized. It will require a national strategy to counteract violence and instability in the Third World. It is also important to note that in a multipolar world, America cannot act alone. Our allies will have to play major roles.

The second phase of Peacetime Engagement—Nation-Building—is a task which should be left to economists, diplomats, and politicians. The military's predominant role here is in the attempt to maintain a stable security environment—to counteract violence. Even though the civilian elements of national power possess the undisputed lead in this phase, the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations communities could play a significant supporting role.

The word is out! Third World dictators do not want to become the next Saddam Hussein. The experts agree, OOTW is a part of the future. Containment worked because it was a long-range, coherent national strategy. Peacetime Engagement, supported by SOF and the intelligence community, holds a similar promise. American morality, a victim of the Cold War, will hopefully become preeminent. Former Assistant Secretary Locher's Peacetime Engagement strategy provides an answer. The question now is: "Can a highly pluralistic and democratic country make it a reality?"

LTC Adolph, Special Forces, is a former MI officer. He holds a masters' degrees in international affairs and national security studies and strategy. Adolph recently returned from U.N. duty in Cambodia. He currently serves with the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, NC.

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Operations Other Than War
Standard Symbology

by Captain Robert E. Slaughter

The reorientation of the Army's focus toward Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is changing the emphasis of U.S. Army contingency planning. This shift emphasizes the importance of the OOTW intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. The doctrinal framework for intelligence operations in OOTW is sound and proven. However, the process used to graphically capture and communicate intelligence in OOTW is not standardized. Timeliness, accuracy, and dissemination of intelligence suffer accordingly, particularly at lower echelons.

This article highlights the need for standardized symbology, and the need to communicate graphic products quickly, simply, and uniformly at all echelons. I have also included an OOTW symbol methodology the 7th Infantry Division (Light)(7ID)(L) developed.

Ironically, part of the problem can be traced to the flexibility of **FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols**. This field manual was written within the context of conventional NATO operations. The manual tacitly acknowledges a shortcoming in OOTW or unconventional intelligence symbology. It allows the creation of nonstandard symbols within broad guidelines—simplicity, uniformity, and clarity. However, these guidelines are not met when more than one staff element at any echelon exchanges OOTW intelligence products unique to that unit.

A Colombian Scenario

In September 1992, 7ID(L) deployed to Colombia on a staff training exercise with the Colombian War College. During this exercise, the significance of nonstandardized OOTW intelligence symbology was magnified. In a counter-drug scenario, a combined and joint U.S. and Colombian task force staff exercised and exchanged OOTW tactics, techniques, and procedures, including IPB products.

From the outset, nonstandard OOTW intelligence symbology confused the exchange of information. The "U.S.-pure" unit used different activity symbols than the J2, as did the "U.S.-advised" and "Colombian-pure" units. Symbology also differed by service: the Navy used one method while the Air Force used another.

The result was that someone had to translate the symbols. Consequently, it slowed the dissemination of critical information, made the horizontal flow of information "text heavy," and consumed the S2 and commander's most precious resource—time. This crippled the decision cycle as commanders waited for a "translation" of critical intelligence.

The situation forced the combined task force to create simple, standardized OOTW symbols that all levels, services, and nationalities could exchange. To achieve this we resorted to a mix of conventional symbology, Colombian symbology, and our imaginations.

This problem is not just applicable to the Colombian scenario. Many other allied and friendly countries that rely on U.S. doctrine are embroiled in counterinsurgencies, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations. The OOTW symbology void forces them to improvise. Even among U.S. units, this process varies. The result is conflicting solutions. This problem severely damages our ability to assist and conduct operations with these nations and to provide our commanders timely intelligence.

Solutions

We must standardize our graphics for the OOTW intelligence process. If we don't standardize, automation will be unable to untangle the imaginative but infinite variety of graphics that S2s and their commanders develop. OOTW IPB will cease to have a credible impact.

To address this, either HQ, TRADOC, proponent for **FM 101-5-1**, or the Intelligence Center, proponent for **FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict**, needs to staff and publish a standard symbology for OOTW. The symbology must meet five goals:

- ☐ **Standardization.** All echelons must be able to immediately understand all symbols and overlays. Make maximum use of existing symbols from **FM 101-5-1**.
- ☐ **Clarity and differentiation.** Promote concise, clear visual presentation of information in a way that facilitates analysis of similar and different activities.
- ☐ **Simplicity.** Use shapes from a common military template because most work will be done by hand. Rely on one color (black or red). Select codes that, either alphabetically or by a symbol, abbreviate an activity and prompt the reader's recognition of that activity.
- ☐ **Cross-referencing.** Show this connection visually by displaying events that are connected, or possibly connected. Make the information easy to recall and share at all echelons.
- ☐ **Critical information display.** Visually display, without clutter, the date, time, type of incident, and other information critical to the event.

Techniques

What follows is the symbology and plotting techniques the author, intelligence officers, and G2 section of 7ID(L) developed. We focused on the five goals and addressed three categories of intelligence information that require graphic display: incidents, targets, and population status. In creating the methodology we addressed symbols, plotting, and data base maintenance.

Symbols. For standardization, simplicity, and to "frame" our symbols, we chose four basic shapes found on most military templates. For clarity and differentiation, we chose shapes that are clearly distinguishable from one another and do not need color to enhance them. This is important since the Diazo machines used to reproduce overlays during operations are monochrome, and do not read blue ink.

Depending on the S2's available field resources, the shapes can be further highlighted using colors to code them. The main considerations are to avoid blue and to use bright colors that clearly differ from one another.

- ☐ Red = violent activity and antigovernment population.
- ☐ Green = political activity/progovernment population.
- ☐ Purple = suspicious activity/neutral population.
- ☐ Black = other activity and target symbols, and population status codes and information.

For standardization, clarity and differentiation, simplicity, and critical information display, we selected simple symbols (from **FM 101-5-1** if possible)

or alphabetic characters. These are placed inside the shapes and prompt the viewer to recognize the activity with little or no additional information. This is the "meat" of the symbology.



We tried to avoid duplication and to be as specific about the activity as possible. We also limited the number of other symbols that did not fit inside these symbols (for example, oil lines and roads). "Activity" was broadly defined as actions, qualifiers of action, targets, and units.

Plotting. Besides standardizing the symbols to display information, we designed a standard method of plotting data. In an OOTW environment, many things occur at the same place, but at different times. For example, a surveillance, an assassination, and follow-up propaganda could all occur at a critical road intersection on the same day. On a 24- or 48-hour overlay, this can lead to clutter, resulting in a loss of clarity and delays in interpreting the information.



For standardization and clarity, we avoided plotting information at the center of mass or the lower left-hand corner of the symbols. Instead, we placed the symbols on stalks. The end of the stalk is the location where the incident occurred.

We also wanted to graphically add the dimension of time. This becomes an important aspect of pattern analysis as the analyst attempts to relate events occurring throughout the battlefield. To do this, we oriented the stalks to a 24-hour clock, starting with the 0000 hours position as north or 0 degrees. We continued clockwise with 0600 hours at 90 degrees, 1200 hours at 180 degrees, and so on. This shows the relative times of incidents and, more important, the sequence of events. It relates these times and sequences with locations in the area of operations.



Because information is rarely received in the sequence that it happens, this technique also allows us to "insert" events in their proper sequence.



If events occur that cannot be pinpointed—for instance, something happened in a town but not at a specific location—we used the same "stalk and clock" method. However, we circled the area and ran the stalks off the circle to show that the report was of activity in a general area.

We also addressed the possibility of numerous events occurring at the same time and place within

an hour of each other. For example, an ambush and a kidnapping occur in the same town within 30 minutes. For simplicity, standardization, and clarity, we simply overlaid the symbols at the end of a stalk.



To communicate direction and movement, for simplicity, standardization, and clarity, we followed the example of **FM 101-5-1** and used simple, black arrows, pointed in the direction of the movement. We differed from the field manual by placing the unit symbol on a stalk. This allowed us to graphically display the approximate time of movement.

If the movement was unconfirmed, or projected, we followed the example in the field manual and dashed the arrows.

The last consideration in plotting OOTW symbols was the method used to display critical supplemental information. We used black as the standard color for this information. For standardization, clarity, cross-referencing, and display of critical information, we included, in a standardized format—



- ☐ The date-time group of the event (or in its absence, time the report was received).
- ☐ The spot report and log numbers from the master log.
- ☐ Any related spot report and log numbers.
- ☐ Any critical peripheral information, such as a license plate number.



Data base maintenance. Our final task was to manage the graphic information in a way that did not overwhelm the overlay nor degrade the analyst's ability to interpret the data. To avoid clutter, we posted only information that was gathered in consecutive 24-hour periods. Often, the events of the previous day needed to be evaluated or connected to the current day. In this case, we posted those events on a separate overlay and rolled them down as needed.



Conclusion

The OOTW symbology method presented here is not meant to be the final solution. It simply shows how the 7ID(L) approached this gap in standardization. As the Army tackles OOTW, its doctrine must evolve to meet the challenges of the next century.

We cannot afford to let this simple, basic, but critical methodology continue to create confusion. If we do not correct this, our soldiers will pay the price in blood for untimely decisions that are flawed and delayed by confusion in the exchange of intelligence.

CPT Slaughter is Chief, DOTCSE, 7ID(L). He has a bachelor's degree in communications from Boston University, and has served in various staff and command positions in the U.S., Korea, and Europe.

CORPS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ELEMENT

by **Captain Audrey Clark**

The Army needs innovative ways to do more with less because of current and future budget cuts. One innovative organization in MI is the Corps Military Intelligence Support Element (CMISE). The CMISE is an invaluable asset. It provides the corps commander an expanded and flexible intelligence capability.

CMISE is a direct support, echelons above corps (EAC) unit, tailored to meet the intelligence requirements of the supported corps. Its soldiers form a dedicated team of experts familiar with corps, theater, and national intelligence systems and structures. CMISE fully integrates into the corps intelligence structure under the operational control of the corps G2.

As a relatively new organization within the intelligence community, CMISE serves as a bridge between theater and national intelligence agencies and their tactical consumers at echelons corps and below. At corps level, CMISE bridges the gap when a corps headquarters deploys and provides continuity of intelligence operations.

Within the theater, CMISE leverages the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to ensure it focuses on support to the corps during operations. CMISE also provides the corps greater access to national intelligence structures through affiliation with the EAC MI brigade and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

What can the CMISE do that the corps can't already do by itself? CMISE can perform many critical functions for the corps:

- ☐ Probably the most important contribution to the corps is the additional capability to do split-based operations. Members of the CMISE provide continuity during exercises or real contingencies when they remain at home station, pull intelligence from higher echelons, and push finished intelligence to the corps.
- ☐ CMISE deploys an Intelligence Support Element (ISE) with the corps to provide greater continuity and expanded links to higher echelons.
- ☐ While the corps focuses on one country during an exercise or contingency, the CMISE watches other countries in the corps area of interest.
- ☐ During peacetime, CMISE expands the number of regions or countries the corps can watch. It provides the corps with a strategic intelligence capability focused on the commander's requirements.
- ☐ CMISE supports the corps at any point along the operational continuum, as it provides the corps commander with versatility in intelligence support.

In spite of its small size, the CMISE promises to make a significant contribution to corps intelligence.

CPT Clark is Commander, CMISE, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC. She graduated from William and Mary College, and earned a master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College. CPT Clark is a graduate of MIOAC and the SIGINT Course.

Officer Professional Readings Bibliography

In 1990, the 434th MI Detachment (Strategic) was assigned to support the Threat Branch, Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science (DTIMS), Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Our '93-'94 training program outline requires us to develop "an unclassified list of professional readings on intelligence matters for distribution to MI officers in the field."

In particular, we want to know what MI personnel consider the most important written material currently available to the professional MI officer. What books, periodicals, professional journals, bibliographies, and field manuals do they consider required reading for professional development.

For example, David Kahn's **Code Breakers** is an excellent history of secret communications, while Dulles' **Craft of Intelligence** is a good general history of American intelligence. Periodicals of value might include the U.S. Army Intelligence Center's **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,** while **FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis**, could be a recommended manual. Finally, Walter Pforzheimer's **A Bibliography of Intelligence Literature** is an excellent resource for MI officers and academics alike.

We want all intelligence professionals to know about this project. You can help us by recommending materials that cover a variety of subjects, including intelligence history, organizations, biographies, and activities. As well, you may want to recommend some favorite work. Collection, analysis, special activities, and counterintelligence are all especially pertinent topics.

For further information or to submit suggestions, contact LTC Simmons, Phone/FAX: 203-535-8378.

(Continued from page 21)
tional border. Stubborn adherence to false assumptions is a common failing. The analyst never acts alone. Analysts are always part of an organization with its own values, expectations, biases, pressures to conform, and political motivations. They work in an environment that does not always reward dissent, discrepant information, or uncertainty.

When dissenting views come from junior officers, superiors often suppress or ignore them. When Commander Arthur McCollum, Chief, Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, prepared a message alerting the Pacific fleet, he was denied permission by four senior admirals who thought that sufficient warnings had already been sent.[24]

Dissenters can also be senior officials as was the case with Admiral Richmond Turner, Chief, Navy Department War Plans, who believed that Hawaii would be attacked.

" If there is going to be an improvement in intelligence, there must be a corresponding movement within Army education."

Intelligence analysts work within an organization, often a military one, and institutions themselves are subject to bureaucracy, compartmentalization, security, and faulty communication or rivalry between agencies or services.

Group dynamics, or "group think," can also affect the decision-making process. It is hard to resist the conclusions of a group of peers. The group can be as large as the entire American society. An example of "group think" was President Kennedy's inner council of advisors prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. There are few people who would challenge a president's or general's decision.

Intelligence analysts are sometimes overwhelmed by trivial detail, daily workload, and unrealistic expectations. It is difficult to sift the relevant information from the noise prior to an event. It is understandable that analysts want to evaluate every scrap of information that comes their way—any clue that might help them reach correct conclusions.

To a military leader, there is little difference between no warning and not being warned "in time." General MacArthur concluded that even a 72-hour warning of the initial North Korean attack would have made little difference to operations.

Current Applications

In reviewing instances where intelligence has failed, we come to some obvious conclusions. Science can be of little help when dealing with the often irrational and unpredictable human mind. It is little wonder that many of the invaders of our century have been called "madmen." If intelligence analysis is as much art as science, future failures are inevitable. However, we can improve the odds of success by adding to our understanding of intelligence analysis and human behavior.

Education is critical in bringing about change. If there is going to be an improvement in intelligence, there must be a corresponding movement within Army education to encourage positive leadership attitudes, dissenting opinions, imaginative new approaches to analysis, open-mindedness, and interservice cooperation. This can be done in basic, advanced, and precommand courses.

It would be useful to create a higher tolerance for false alarms through training. We would have to be willing to accept higher costs in dollars and readiness, but it could prevent surprise attacks and perhaps convince an enemy of our readiness.

Endnotes

1. Keith Jeffery, "Intelligence and Military History: A British Perspective," in David A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson, editors, **Military History and the Military Profession**, 1992.
2. Roberta Wohlstetter, **Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision**, 1962, 385.
3. Wohlstetter, 387.
4. U.S. Congress, Senate. 1946a, **Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack**, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C., 65, 102, 105, 126.
5. Ephraim Kam, **Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective**, Harvard University Press, 1988, 47, 48.
6. Wohlstetter, 389, 90.
7. U.S. Congress, 258.
8. Wohlstetter, 312.
9. Quoted in Kam, 102.
10. Wohlstetter, 401.
11. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, editors, **Strategic Military Surprise**, Transaction Books, 1983, New Brunswick, NJ, 80.
12. Knorr, 81.
13. Knorr, 82.
14. James F. Schnabel, **Policy and Direction: The First Year**, Center of Military History, GPO, 1992, 63.
15. Schnabel, 63.
16. Schnabel, 63.
17. Schnabel, 64.
18. Schnabel, 62.
19. Matthew B. Ridgway, **The Korean War**, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1967, 14.
20. James R. Arnold, **Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam**, Osprey Publishing Ltd., London, 1990, 36.
21. Arnold, 86.
22. Kam, 39, 41, 42.
23. James Wirtz, **The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War**, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991.
24. James Wirtz makes the point that U.S. analysts have a weakness for SIGINT over other less-reliable sources of intelligence and thus fall victim to what he calls the ULTRA syndrome, 274.

James P. Finley is the command historian for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca.

(*Continued from page 5*)

new systems (both hardware and software) getting to units. We need some help in top-feeding the TO&Es that reflect this new concept. We also need doctrine that accurately delineates G2 and MI unit functions and a modification of the ACE TO&E. The MI unit commander must retain an analytic and tasking element to correctly perform the mission. I think we've got a great future and I look forward to my part in bringing us into the 21st century.

LTC John D. Frketic
Fort Campbell, KY

Editor's Note:
LTC Frketic's letter presents an opportunity to briefly discuss the ***ACE Functional Concept*** *and the advantages and implementation of the ACE.*

The ACE Functional Concept, October 1993*, describes the functional capabilities of the ACE at division, corps, and echelons above corps. This concept expands the principle of split-based support to force projection, supports the principle of seamless intelligence, and exploits the advantages of improved intelligence collection, processing, and reporting technologies. The Army is fielding these technologies today.*

MI is implementing the approved ACE Functional Concept*. Implementation of the ACE is a critical component of the Intelligence Branch Operational Concept.*

The ACE is also an integral part of the approved intelligence mission area Force Design Update ***required for downsizing the Army****. This concept is a result of the 1991-1992 MI Relook—to streamline and downsize MI as directed. Collocation and functional integration of the DTOCSE or TSE (TOC Support Element) and the TCAE, combined with improved technologies, allow MI to downsize while improving synchronization of intelligence operations.*

The proposed A-series TOE of the ACE authorizes approximately 33 less personnel than the L-series TOEs of the TCAE and DTOCSE (in a heavy division). The comparison includes Ground Station Module teams in the A-series TOE but does not include the communication control team (ASAS) and the TROJAN SPIRIT team. These teams would be added to any unit's TOE that received those systems.

The environment in which the current MI structure was created no longer exists. During the Cold War, Army doctrine and systems were designed to fight a defensive war against a technologically advanced opponent in Central Europe. MI weighted their units heavily with tactical SIGINT assets. Aging communications systems, limited processing capabilities, the volume of available intelligence, and the lethality of the European scenario led the Army to develop a redundant force structure. Today, the Army faces the challenge of force projection. MI organizations must balance intelligence disciplines, consolidate resources, exploit emerging technologies, and remain deployable and scalable to support force projection.

Integrating collection management, analysis, targeting, and synthesis in the ACE eliminates both the physical and mental gaps between technical control and the other functions of IEW operations. This consolidation eliminates an existing deficiency. ***The ACE centralizes all mission management for SIGINT, IMINT, and CI/HUMINT under the "ACE umbrella" depending on tactical tailoring.***

Battle Staff tasks within the analysis cell include: perform technical control of collection assets, manage and maintain the data base, and identify gaps and generate requirements(to preform mission management). Splitting technical control and/or data base management functions from the ACE would complicate the synchronization of intelligence operations.

There are not enough 98Cs in the ACE to remove ten 98Cs as LTC Frketic suggests. Furthermore, ten 98Cs would be unable to perform technical control without additional automation systems. The centralization of technical control and/or data base management is the most efficient use of manpower.

Collection management, IEW synchronization, and the IEW synchronization matrix are explicitly embedded and remain critical functions in the ACE Functional Concept. "Performs Collection Management" is one of the six collective mission essential tasks of the ACE (page B-4). The IEW synchronization matrix is specifically identified as one of four collection management battle tasks (page B-7).

The ACE configuration consists of the planning and coordination, intelligence synchronization, and analysis cells. All three cells assist in the function of collection management. The components are physically centered in a "fusion area" within the ACE. This configuration facilitates a synergistic effect on intelligence planning and execution. Draft ***FM 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System for the Analysis and Control Elements,*** *provides further doctrinal guidance.*

The ACE concept improves the responsiveness and timeliness of the intelligence operating system. Integration of the TSE and TCAE is the most critical element of the ACE concept. During training exercises in 1993, the 24th Infantry Division (MX), XVIII Airborne Corps, 111th MI Brigade (Training), and III Corps used ACE prototypes. Unit commanders have commented on the positive impact of the ACE. Following a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) on December 11, 1993, III Corps stated: "The combined capabilities of the TSE...and the TCAE are very powerful and are made even more so with ASAS."

We understand the concern over the roles and responsibilities of the G2 and MI battalion commander and are currently redefining those roles and responsibilities. Initially, the distinction of roles was not adequately articulated. The ACE is organized on the MI battalion/brigade TOE at division/corps level but is under operational control of the G2. In the current IEW Processing Architecture, the G2/senior intelligence officer—

1. Provides intelligence support to the commander.

2. Prioritizes and focuses all division intelligence operations.

3. Synchronizes intelligence plans with operations plans.

4. Develops intelligence plans for current and future operations.

5. Identifies intelligence tasks to the ACE and MI battalion.

The MI battalion commander—

1. Executes the G2's intelligence plan.

2. Employs assets and organizations to support the G2 and maneuver commanders (asset management).

3. Assists the G2 in developing intelligence operations.

4. Trains, organizes, and leads MI units.

The "symbiotic" and "sanity check" relationships between the G2 and MI battalion commander are still necessary to ensure the synchronization of intelligence operations. The ACE Concept strengthens and supports these relationships.

The G2 will still maintain a close relationship with the G3 through the G2 collateral enclave. This organization performs the G2 plans and operations functions and is an integral part of the Battle Command Center. The collateral enclave consists of the G2, the G2 sergeant major, four other officers, two warrant officers (order of battle technicians), and two enlisted soldiers.

The ACE concept has adequate flexibility and redundancy even without the mobile TOC. The Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE), which was originally designed to support the mobile TOC, provides redundancy, and a critical force projection capability. A DISE is not a specific piece of equipment or a specific configuration. It is a tactically tailored organization with communications, automated intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast intelligence capability. This capability enables the commander to pull intelligence from data bases at all levels. This flexible and scalable organization can deploy on a force projection operation.

The DISE provides commanders access to corps, theater, and national intelligence products, assets, and data bases. Its mission is to provide the deployed commander with accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence across the range of military operations during the rapid introduction of U.S. Forces. There are two types of configurations: Mini-DISE (manpack) and DISE (vehicular). During large-scale deployments the DISE is deployed with the forward assault element until the Main or Tactical CP arrives. Then the DISE can move where its capabilities are required, based on METT-T.

The Intelligence Center understands the concern over the implementation of doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) for the ACE. ***However, DTLOMS is being implemented according to the ASAS Block 1 Extended Program.*** *Implementation of DTLOMS will not occur simultaneously and concurrently. We are preparing an ACE implementation message. Comments and questions concerning ACE doctrine should be sent to Doctrine and Publications Division, Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine; phone 602-538-0674/0675 or DSN 879-0674/0675; PROFS ATZS-TDL HUACHUCA1; FAX 602-533-6308 or DSN 821-6308.*

Current ACE initiatives include--

1. ACE is embedded in draft ***FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,*** *that has been distributed to the field for review and draft* ***FM 34-25-3, All-Source Analysis System for the Analysis and Control Elements,*** *that is targeted for distribution to the field for review this spring. Both FMs are available for download on the Tactics Division Bulletin Board Service (BBS) at DSN 821-1992 or Commercial 602-533-1992. See page 53 of the* ***October-December 1993 issue of MIPB*** *or the administrative page of this issue for information on the Tactics Division BBS.*

2. Several units have successfully used an ACE prototype during 1993, and will continue to use the prototype. Additionally, officer and enlisted students at Fort Huachuca are receiving classroom instruction on the ACE and hands-on training with ASAS in a brigade TOC and a division ACE.

3. The Intelligence Center is supporting ASAS Block 1 Extended to provide ASAS functionality to all Active and Reserve Component MI units by the end of FY 95.

4. As part of Operation Desert Capture II, we plan to configure a DISE for the 24th ID during NTC rotation 94-7.

5. Mini-DISE (manpack) are currently deployed with forces in Macedonia and Croatia. The DISE will also be embedded in doctrine and is included in officer and enlisted courses at the Intelligence Center.

6. We anticipate heavy and light (to include airborne and air assault) division A-series TOEs to be completed by fall 1994 with an available E-date of October 1994. The ACE authorization is currently planned as four officers, eight warrant officers (WOs), and sixty nine enlisted.

SECTION	OFF	WO	ENL
HQ Element	1	0	2
Comm Control	0	0	4
Trojan Spirit	0	0	9
Single Source (Tech Control and Processing)	1	3	15
All-Source Intel	2	5	39

The success of the ACE as it is implemented depends on the execution of forthcoming doctrine, force structure, and materiel fielding. The ACE affects many concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for IEW operations. ***The active support and proactive planning of all affected units are critical to ensure the success of this new organization.*** *The Intelligence Center will continue to push hard to ensure full implementation of the ACE by the end of FY 95.*

"ACE is an idea whose time has come." *Major General John F. Stewart Jr., Commanding General, USAIC&FH.*

To the Editor:

This is a response to the letter by Mr. Peter Gardner (October-December 1993). Mr. Gardner is wrong when he insists IPB and IPB products could not be done for the L.A. riots.

I am not product oriented when it comes to the IPB process, but I do contend that an MCOO could have been prepared to support the L.A. operation. I further believe that several different MCOOs may have been required, depending on the different types of (threats) your force might encounter. The MCOO is a graphic representation of the combined analysis of weather, terrain, and the battlefield environment. If the analysis had been done, a useful MCOO could have been produced.

Mr. Gardner's comments on SLOW GO/NO GO areas in L.A. reinforce my comments that people need to understand the thought process behind the products. His statement that all terrain was GO demonstrates a misunderstanding of the degree of analysis that needs to go into the IPB process. You must get down in the weeds with the enemy. Understand what his courses of action are and how he would use the terrain.

As an example, a gang probably would not use a four-lane highway as an avenue due to restrictive entrances and exits, lack of cover, and ease of observation. On the other hand, a large mob probably would not go down a narrow alley but tend to flow down hill in the more open areas. The questions he was asking in his letter are just the questions that should have been answered through analysis and production of a MCOO.

He must first determine who the enemy (threat) is for a given situation. If more than one threat is active you may need more than one MCOO. An MCOO for a gang of 8 to 10 people would be quite different from an MCOO for a riot of several hundred people. An MCOO for special operations should be quite different from a

standard MCOO, showing avenues or mobility corridors for an armor division.

One of the critical skills in applying the IPB process is to understand it well enough to adapt the process to a variety of situations. In saying MCOOs and other IPB products cannot be produced for L.A.-type operations, you are "throwing the baby out with the bath water!"

Mr. Gardner further states that the so-called "enemy" demonstrated no doctrine, no standard formation, and no operational patterns. I have to disagree! When a human is involved in repeating an action more than once, patterns will be established. You can pick out some patterns by just watching the news footage of the riots (i.e., attacks on individuals at intersections and type of shops being looted).

I did not, in my previous letter, advocate breaking the law by collecting intelligence on individual citizens or groups. I do believe sufficient research is available in libraries and universities to develop a good profile on the anatomy of gangs and also on riots. This information could serve as a basic data base which would later be filled in with particulars and personalities.

Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for each echelon should reflect the intelligence needs of that command, not just repeating the needs of the next high command. A list of higher PIR can be provided to subordinate units for information, but should be translated into collection tasking to subordinate units when the subordinate unit is expected to satisfy intelligence requirements. PIR should be defined based on the current situation and updated as the situation changes. They should not be taken from a standard prepared listing or guide.

I also take exception with Mr. Gardner's definition of the objective of IPB. It does far more than "inform" or "paint a picture." The new draft **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,** defines IPB as "a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. Applying the process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield."

IPB is not just an intelligence process; it is a commander-driven staff process that must be applied with initiative and understanding. It is not an easy process, but must not be abandoned as "too hard" when the situation changes.

In regard to Mr. Gardner's concerns about my producing an MCOO for the 40th ID and the CA-ARNG, I would be happy to show them how it could be done. I will also extend the same invitation to Mr. Gardner that I did to LTC Wenger's S2 NCOIC. I will gladly teach anyone who wants to take the time to come to Fort Leavenworth, how to adapt the IPB process to their mission.

There are many individuals out there who understand the IPB process well enough to adapt it to current situations. I would recommend contacting the 82d Airborne, 2d Brigade, S2 Section, about how they adapted to relief operations in Florida.

I currently teach as part of the Tactical Commander's Development Course, DSN 552-2762.

MAJ George D. Womack
Fort Leavenworth, KS

To the Editor:

I must take strong exception to a statement made in your July-September 1993 issue.

In the "Total Force" column (page 46) under "MI Linguist MOS," it states, "Moreover, the expertise and hands-on knowledge a native speaker possesses cannot normally be duplicated by a DLI graduate."

As a 98G with 16 years of Active and Reserve experience, I can state unequivocally that "native" speakers do not, as a rule, possess any expertise that would make them superior to a DLI graduate. Many native speakers do not possess a sufficient knowledge of their own language (witness English speakers!!) or they have serious problems with the English language and, thus, are rendered ineffective.

The 97L MOS appears to be another attempt to fix the chronic linguist shortage "on the cheap," like the effort in the early '80's, with the Stripes-for-Skills Program, which was an abysmal failure as far as languages were concerned.

Let's learn from our mistakes. A quick fix is usually no fix at all.

John W. Bailey
Beech Grove, IN

FM 34-8-2, G2/S2 Handbook

The USAIC&FH Doctrine Division, DOTD is developing **FM 34-8-2** and requests your input. This handbook will provide the G2/S2 with proven doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures in a useful format. Please provide input on the contents to ensure it is a useful tool to you and your soldiers. We request hard and/or soft copy of any G2 or S2 handbooks and checklists that are applicable. Provide input and/or examples no later than May 15, 1994, to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-D, (CPT Moorhead), Fort Huachuca AZ 85613-6000.

We have also established a Doctrine Bulletin Board Service (BBS) for input. A topic sentence outline and preliminary draft are posted on the BBS in the G2S2.WP file. Log in with the following information: first name - G2; last name - S2; password - handbook. Action officer is CPT Moorhead at DSN 821-2676 or FAX DSN 821-6308.

(Continued from page 31)

tions we progressed quickly. The Kuwaitis depicted desert terrain much better than we did. We learned from each other.

One issue raised during construction of the terrain board concerned the Kuwaiti order of battle. All the lieutenants felt they must depict their brigade garrison location. This was eventually completed at the expense of some towns already on the board.

We had all the natural and man-made features on the board by the end of day one. Most of the Kuwaitis thought the terrain board was complete. We gathered around the legend, and I described the need for blue and red graphics. We slept on the terrain board that night to keep people and animals from damaging our work.

On day two, the Kuwaitis began to realize how serious we were about producing a quality product when they saw our sleeping arrangements. One Kuwaiti commented, "we have made terrain boards before, but we have never taken them to this detail, and we were never this serious."

Execution

The Kuwaitis conducted the rehearsal. We were prepared to run the rehearsal if necessary.

The CPX commander arrived to inspect the board two hours before the briefing. I briefed the intelligence portion of the rehearsal after orientating him to the terrain board. He politely told me a half hour before the briefing that my services as "interpreter of the enemy" were not needed.

The final positive contribution was made by our commander who recommended the rehearsal agenda. He suggested an action/reaction event-phased rehearsal similar to the method we successfully used at the NTC. This was a new concept to the Kuwaitis. At first the Kuwaitis were hesitant but eventually agreed to the proposal.

The Kuwaitis had accepted most of our suggestions by the rehearsal.

It was a very rewarding exercise. The rehearsal was not perfect but the Kuwaitis adapted the terrain board and the rehearsal to meet their requirements.

CPT Mark A. Farrar is currently an action officer at the Mounted Warfighting Battle Lab, Fort Knox, KY. He has served as S2, 3d (Greywolf) Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; a mechanized infantry battalion S2, 3d ID; Chief of Counterintelligence Analysis Section, III (U.S.) Corps; and a company commander in the 504th MI Brigade.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations for the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame throughout the year. Anyone can nominate an individual for induction into the MI Hall of Fame. Eligible for nomination are commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army.

A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI which reflects favorably on the MI Corps. In certain isolated instances (particularly in the case of junior soldiers), the nomination may be based on heroic actions and valorous awards rather than other documented contributions.

Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the time of their nomination. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. An annual Hall of Fame Board convenes to review nominations and to make recommendations to the Chief of Military Intelligence. However, the Chief of Military Intelligence is the final approving authority for inductions into the Hall of Fame.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (Mr. Chambers), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; or call DSN 821-1180 or Commercial 602-533-1180.

PUBLISHED IEW DOCTRINE CONSOLIDATED LISTING

Manual	Title	Publication Date	DA Form 12 Block Number
FM 34-1	IEW Operations	02 Jul 87	1117
FM 34-2	Collection Management	08 Mar 94	1118
FM 34-2-1	TTP for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance	19 Jun 91	4873
FM 34-3	Intelligence Analysis	15 Mar 90	1119
FM 34-5 (S)	Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations	10 Jan 94	0530
FM 34-7	IEW Support to Low-Intensity Conflict	18 May 93	5104
FM 34-8	Combat Commander's Handbook	28 Sep 92	6160
FM 34-10	Division IEW Operations	25 Nov 86	0476
FM 34-10A (S)	Appendix B, FM 34-10	15 Dec 86	0185
FM 34-10-1	TTP for the REMBASS	18 Jun 91	3998
FM 34-10-2	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems	13 Jul 93	0596
FM 34-10-3 (O)	Trailblazer Operations	29 Mar 90	0598
FM 34-10-7	Quickfix Operations	30 Sep 91	0593
FM 34-10-13 (O)	Technical Control and Analysis Center	14 Aug 89	0602
FM 34-10-15 (C)	AN/FSQ 144 (V) TROJAN	15 Aug 89	4510
FM 34-13	MI BN Leader's Handbook for Platoons & Teams	15 Apr 83	0479
FM 34-25	Corps IEW Operations	30 Sep 87	1121
FM 34-25-6 (S)	The Electronic Processing and Dissemination System	15 Jun 92	4970
FM 34-35	ACR and Separate Brigade IEW Operations	12 Dec 90	1122
FM 34-36	SOF Intelligence and EW Operations	30 Sep 91	4874
FM 34-37	EAC IEW Operations	15 Jan 91	1124
FM 34-40 (S)	Electronic Warfare Operations	09 Oct 87	1125
FM 34-40-2 (O)	Basic Cryptanalysis	13 Sep 90	4607
FM 34-40-3 (C)	Tactical Signals Intelligence	21 May 91	4876
FM 34-40-5 (S)	Voice Intercept Operations	14 Aug 92	4879
FM 34-40-7	Communications Jamming Handbook	23 Nov 92	0597
FM 34-40-9	Direction Finding Operations	29 Aug 91	5046
FM 34-40-12 (C)	Morse Code Intercep\ Operations	26 Aug 91	3862
FM 34-40-13 (S)	Electronic Intelligence	10 Sep 91	5027
FM 34-52	Intelligence Interrogation	28 Sep 92	1130
FM 34-54	Battlefield Technical Intelligence	05 Apr 90	1132
FM 34-60	Counterintelligence	05 Feb 90	1134
FM 34-80	Brigade and Battalion IEW Operations	15 Apr 86	1141
FM 34-81	Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations	31 Aug 89	0484
FM 34-81-1	Battlefield Weather Effects	23 Dec 92	5215
FM 34-82	MI Unit Exercise Development Guide	26 Nov 85	1142
FM 34-85	Conversion of WARSAW Pact Grids to UTM Grids	25 Sep 81	0485
FM 34-85-1	Mideast GK Conversion	02 Feb 83	1143
FM 34-130	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield	23 May 89	4432
FM 90-2A (S)	Electronic Deception	12 Jun 89	4013
TC 30-18 (C)	GUARDRAIL/QUICKLOOK	20 Jun 78	0592
TC 34-40-1 (C)	SIGINT/EW Templating	06 Nov 87	0116
TC 34-40-6 (S)	SIGINT	11 Apr 89	0532
TC 34-55	Imagery Intelligence	03 Oct 88	1133
TC 34-84	AN/TLQ-17A	09 Mar 84	1384
TC 34-94	Establish a COMSEC Monitor Site	30 Aug 84	0093
TC 34-95 (C)	AN/TRQ-30(V) and AN/TRQ-32(V)	01 May 85	0600
TC 34-98 (C)	AN/TRQ-30(V)	29 May 84	0601
TC 34-100	Portable Radio Direction Finding Systems	12 May 87	1391
TC 34-111	OG-181 PIRANHA Operations	08 Sep 86	1401
TC 34-114	Establish a GSR Site	30 Aug 84	1403
ARTEP 1-118-30-DRILL	Crew Drills for the AN/ALQ-151(V)2, QUICKFIX IIB, Special Purpose Countermeasure System Operational Procedures	23 Jul 92	1037
ARTEP 34-245-10-DRILL	Drills/Procedures for the Intelligence Section	31 Dec 87	0295
ARTEP 34-267-30-DRILL	Man-Portable Vehicular Radio Receiver and Direction Finder Processor System	12 Dec 91	1282
ARTEP 34-268-15-DRILL	Drills for the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System	13 Jul 92	1227
ARTEP 34-285-30-DRILL	Drills for the Control and Analysis System AN/TSQ-130(V) Technical Control and Analysis Center-Division (TCAC-D)	12 Dec 91	1034
ARTEP 34-288-10-DRILL	Battle Drills for the GSR Platoon	01 Jul 87	0302
ARTEP 34-289-10-DRILL	AN/TSQ-138, TRAILBLAZER, Special Purpose	04 Feb 92	1076

Point of contact is Mr. Jim Adams at comm. 602-533-2676/3266, DSN 821-2676/3266

Military Intel
Hall o

HONORARY COLONEL OF THE CORPS

Lieutenant General
Phillip B. Davidson Jr., Retired

Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson Jr., Retired, has been selected as the Honorary Colonel of the MI Corps. He will be inducted as the Honorary Colonel at the July MI Hall of Fame Ceremony. LTG Davidson will replace LTG Sidney T. Weinstein, Retired, who has been the Honorary Colonel of the MI Corps since 1990.

General Davidson had a long and distinguished career in Army Intelligence. In 1942, he became Assistant G2, 96th Infantry Division. From 1943 to 1946, he was a squadron commander and group executive officer in the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group, Mechanized. Following World War II, he studied at the Command and General Staff College; he was subsequently held over to instruct at their School of Intelligence.

In 1948, LTG Davidson became Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch, G2 Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command. He held this position throughout the Korean War. From 1963 until 1969, after a series of assignments unrelated to intelligence, LTG Davidson became Commandant, ASA Training Center and School, Fort Devens; G2, U.S. Army Pacific; and J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

From 1971 until his retirement as a lieutenant general in 1974, LTG Davidson served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, on the Department of the Army staff; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence.

LTG Davidson has received the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (3 OLC), the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart, and the French Croix de Guerre. LTG Davidson was the first officer from the MI Corps to attain flag rank.

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f Fame

HONORARY SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE CORPS

Command Sergeant Major
David P. Klehn, Retired

Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn, Retired, has been selected as the Honorary Sergeant Major of the MI Corps. He will be inducted at the July MI Hall of Fame Ceremony at Fort Huachuca. CSM Klehn will replace CSM Louis H. Rothenstein, Retired, who has been the Honorary Sergeant Major of the MI Corps since 1990.

CSM Klehn enlisted in the Army as an infantryman in April 1961. He served as an automatic rifleman, team leader, and squad leader in the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, GA. From 1963 to 1971, he served with Special Forces units at Fort Bragg, the Panama Canal Zone, and Vietnam.

CSM Klehn began his MI career in 1972 as a counterintelligence (CI) agent in the 111th MI Group in Columbia, SC. From 1973 to 1976, he was assigned to the 9th MI Company at Fort Lewis, WA. In 1978, CSM Klehn was assigned to the 165th MI Battalion in Frankfurt, Germany. In November 1979, he was selected to debrief two of the first hostages released from the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran.

From 1980 to 1984, CSM Klehn was the CSM of the CI/Signal Security Battalion, 902d MI Group at the Presidio of San Francisco. While there, he was awarded the Legion of Merit for his performance. From 1984 to 1989, he was the CSM of the 2d School Battalion at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca and the 66th MI Brigade in Munich, Germany. Finally, he served as the CSM of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School and the second CSM of the MI Corps until his retirement in 1991.

His training, maintaining, and caring have served our corps well in both war and peace and will continue for years to come.

TOTAL FORCE

by Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

The Pentagon describes Total Force as "America's Army." With a changing threat and a shrinking Active Component (COMPO 1), our nation depends more than ever on the Army National Guard (COMPO 2) and Reserve (COMPO 3).

Reserve Cuts. The combined end strength of the Reserves and Guard will decrease by approximately 130,000. The Army Reserve will absorb twice as many cuts as the Army Guard. However, the time for the Army Reserve and Guard to battle over units and jurisdictions is past. While the Army Reserve and Guard have a federal mission, the Army Guard also has unique state missions. Individual states require troops to respond to emergencies. A post Cold-War world requires changes in the Guard and Reserve.

Army Reservists and Guard soldiers in inactivated units have several options. These include: retirement in 20 years; early retirement in 15 years; or retraining in other skills. We should remain positive toward our new role. With better resourced units that are tied to mobilization scenarios, the Army Reserve and Guard will soar in its esteem.

Force Design Update. The MI Proponent addresses the force mix and contribitutions. We need strong MI units in COMPOs 2 and 3. We are activating the divisional MI battalions in the Guard. Enhanced Guard brigades need MI support—a ready Guard MI company is the right answer. The Army Reserve Command is working with the MI Proponent to improve command and control by decreasing the number of regional Reserve commands. We will work on these issues during the spring RC Force Design Update (FDU).

There is a vacuum in policy as it relates to a threat. In the next few years, a policy—such as the Marshall Plan (post World War II)—will evolve. We must ensure the Reserve Components, especially MI, continue as an integral part of America's Army. We must design a ready and accessible "building block" structure.

Why have a Reserve Force? Everybody benefits when America's Army includes full participation of the Army Guard and Reserve. During Vietnam, the country suffered because these forces were not mobilized. During "Operation Desert Shield/Storm," we mobilized 25 percent of our Reserve and Guard force, with the remainder on alert. A unified nation supported that war.

A Farewell Message. This is my last column for **MIPB**. I appreciate all your feedback. I have learned from this dialogue and am pleased that so many Reserve and Guard soldiers read our professional journal. Continue the dialogue with my successor, Colonel John Craig.

I salute the Reserve and Guard soldiers who trained at the Intelligence Center. These soldiers met the Active standard to graduate. To ensure proper recognition, I established the Citizen-Soldier Award for the best Guard or Reserve in each MIOBC class. However, Reserve and Guard soldiers are usually the best or among the best soldiers.

Another group deserving recognition are the talented "full-timers" in MI units. These AGRs who go through the Proponent for our MI courses are first-rate. I urge troop commanders to make full use of these soldiers.

I am proud of all five of our Reserve Forces Intelligence Schools. They are fully accredited and ready for mobilization. I am proud to have assisted the 6th Reserve Forces Intelligence School at Huachuca.

By and large, our strategic detachments are first rate. I enjoyed arranging a CAPSTONE for the 434th MID (Strategic) to the Intelligence Center. The leadership of the 434th is outstanding.

Finally, I am especially proud of serving the Army National Guard. When I arrived six years ago, there were no full-time Guard members at the MI Proponent. The assignment of outstanding personnel changed that. MI continues to grow in size and competence in the Army National Guard.

As a consequence, we now have a new team of Army Reserve, Guard, and Active soldiers that comprise the Reserve Forces Office. We are the point of contact for policy, troop unit operations, and student-soldier support. I am confident this service will improve. I thank all of you. See you in mobilization.

COL Joe Mesch is retiring to Pennsylvania after 30 years as an MI Reserve officer. COL John Craig is now in charge of the Reserve Forces Office. He can be reached at DSN 821-1176/1584 or FAX 602-533-1762.

PROPONENT NOTES

Language Initiatives

The MI Proponent, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), other DA staff agencies, and MACOMs are working together on language initiatives which, when coordinated and implemented, will directly affect MI linguists. The initiatives include—

- ☐ Increased emphasis on recruiting "linguists to be linguists," through the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. This recruiting campaign will bring in more linguists with better foreign language skills. The advantage is twofold: besides the initial language training cost savings, these soldiers could become the "core" linguists in any unit. If otherwise qualified, they could lead the command language programs, with their "native" language capabilities.
- ☐ Approval last October of the Reserve Component MOS 97L, Translator/ Interpreter. This is a significant step forward. We now have an MOS devoted to language issues exclusively. Because of the focus on language rather than MI skills, we expect that this MOS will be used to perform the majority of RC language-related missions.
- ☐ Policy agreements among DA staffs and MACOMs to control unplanned language authorization growth. The DCSINT and DCSOPS will closely screen and control linguist requirements before they are approved. The intent is to validate mission requirements without unwarranted growth.

Significantly, **AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting,** now contains the minimum language proficiency standards to achieve unit readiness.

Since the agreed minimum language proficiency standard is a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2-2, commanders with assigned linguists operating at less than 2-2 proficiency levels need to stress language training to raise their unit readiness posture.

DA has announced that soldiers can now reenlist for language training. The language courses open under this option are the basic, intermediate, or advanced language courses. Qualified soldiers may request retraining from an overage to an understrength language in the same MOS. Your local reenlistment NCO can provide guidance as to which language is over/understrength and further information concerning qualifications.

Reserve Linguist Unit

The First U.S. Army Reserve Unit is actively recruiting linguist soldiers who want to practice their language skills and improve their language proficiency while serving their country. Members of the First USAR Linguist Unit are on nonpay status; they drill for retirement points. The First USAR Unit is subordinate to the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units stationed at Fort Bragg.

Recently, the unit's soldiers served as translators for the Chief, Army Reserve, when it hosted a NATO Reserve Officer's Military Skills Competition. Currently, one of the unit's Russian linguists supports "Task Force Russia," uncovering translated information about possible U.S. prisoners of war held by the former Soviet Union during World War II.

Subordinate detachments are located in San Diego, Houston, Tampa, Detroit, Pittsburg, New York City, and Charlottesville, VA.

For more information, write to Commander, 1st USAR Linguist Unit, ATTN: S1 (Attachment), 6601 Baltimore Ave., Riverside, MD 20737-1025; or call MAJ Craig McKee, 202-736-9057. Include a copy of your latest DLPT score contained on DA Form 330.

To better support your articles, we are requesting our readers to send photographs of MI operations, equipment, and exercises. These should be copyright free, include the full name of the photographer, and a brief note explaining what is in the picture. They can be color or black and white, fairly clear, in focus, and include a way to contact the photographer/owner. Unit PAOs are also encouraged to contact us as a resource.

PROFESSIONAL READING



WAR AND ANTI-WAR: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century by Alvin and Heidi Toffler (Little, Brown and Company) 276 pages, $23.

So you've just finished reading the new **FM 100-5, Operations**, or the newly revised **FM 34** series. Your immediate reaction probably is, why did they change all the terms, especially after 10 years of emphasizing "AirLand Battle." This is an all too common question. For answers, you do not need to look any further than **War and Anti-War**.

The heartbeat of this book provides a rational, well-stated case that answers why terms have changed. The Tofflers present, describe, and relate the military's role in culture through the ages and the impact automation is having on our future. They discuss three levels or waves of civilization. First wave cultures, agrarian-based economies, fought for control of land and food. Second wave cultures started with the industrial revolution and an inclination toward mass production and annihilation of enemy forces. The third wave represents the technology explosion within information and knowledge systems. It is the description and impact of the third wave that drives the present changes in doctrine and the reorganization of MI.

Their treatise of a third wave civilization and its impact on the military lays out the framework to transition from a "cold war" mentality. The third wave explains the knowledge necessary to understand the "Information Highway." For intelligence analysts, an understanding of the knowledge requirements is critical in delivering precision intelligence. The impact of "precision targeting information is just as important as precision targeting weapons...."

War and Anti-War is pertinent to every intelligence soldier. This book's cohesion of separate facts and current events is right on target. Readers will understand why we changed our current doctrine and how we will prepare and fight in the next 10 to 20 years.

CW2 George S. Beasley
Fort Huachuca, AZ

JOINT PUBLICATION 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993) 790 pages.

First produced before Operation Desert Shield/Storm, this DOD authorized publication is an excellent primer on the concepts of Joint Warfare and Joint Operations. This latest version includes an "Afterword" that addresses Desert Storm. This portion of the pamphlet contains comments by the major command participants about the use of Joint Warfare during Desert Storm's planning and execution.

The emphasis on "the team approach" in Joint Warfare will be familiar to anyone who has been to a military school in the last 10 years. The publication ties many of the concepts together in plain, easy-to-read layman's language. It repeatedly demonstrates that Joint Warfare will be our main thrust in the years to come. Chapters include "The Role of American Military Power," "Values in Joint Warfare," "Fundamentals of Joint Warfare," and "The Joint Campaign."

"Joint Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think and train for war." This quote summarizes the theme of this pamphlet. I strongly recommended Joint Publication 1 as NCO or OBC required reading and as a reference for the advanced military student. It is available through military publication channels.

MAJ Richard P. Ugino
Rochester, NY

CIA Special Weapons and Equipment by H. Keith Melton (New York, NY: Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 1993) 128 pages, $15.

This is Keith Melton's third book on Espionage. He is highly qualified for the task having recently served as the consultant for the series "Spies" on the A&E Network. Melton is the leading western expert on espionage equipment.

Melton uses the same format as his second book, **Special Weapons and Equipment of the OSS.** While the second book was taken from the original OSS catalog, this book required considerable research. It took almost 20 years to write. Melton has drawn from many published sources and has toured private collections and museums. The result is an in-depth look at the equipment supplied to CIA agents for use in the field.

The author has divided the book into 12 sections dealing with personal weapons, photographic equipment, agent communications equipment, audio surveillance, surreptitious entry, incendiaries and firing devices, explosives, automotive attack, harassing agents, and accessories. Included are an appendix of CIA medals, identification cards, credentials, and badges; and information on clandestine audio operations.

The cost is so low that every intelligence officer should have this book. It is an excellent companion to Melton's other book on the OSS. By comparing the two books, one can gain an insight into the development of this equipment.

This book should prove useful to military historians, museum directors, and anyone who collects military artifacts. It is well worth owning as part of an intelligence library. If there is any fault with this book, it would be lack of detail on some of the items.

LTC William L. Howard
Largo, FL

The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy edited by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 230 pages, $36.

This scholarly work first defines the theory of grand strategy. Then the author uses case studies showing how states decide to balance their resources and social desires against their perception of international order. States must decide how to use their own domestic policy drivers to ensure survival and growth. The authors use three chapters to define their theory, and then move on to a real-world application of this theory.

The case studies cited are the Anglo-German naval race before World War I, the incoherent U.S. strategy from 1938 to 1950, British strategy and the origins of World War II, internal and external constraints on Soviet strategy, the state and Japanese strategy, and the new nationalism. All of these chapters are grounded in military history, along with social, economic, domestic, and cultural factors.

The starting point in these analyses is insecurity and conflict caused by internal anarchy and external threats. The collapse of the Soviet Union heightened the insecurity of European states, spurring competitive nationalism as a by-product. This also accounts for the aggressive behavior of ethnic groups. When authority collapses in such places as Yugoslavia, ethnicity comes to the fore as a means of self-protection. Depending on various factors, such as geography, groups have strong incentive to conduct a preemptive attack.

The author uses political science to show that states are motivated more by internal forces than by external ones. This is especially true when the survival of the state is not an overriding concern because of some degree of stability in the world order. At the same time, a state may be constrained as the United States and Great Britain were before World War II. Domestic influences led to isolation in the case of the United States and to appeasement in Britain's case, in spite of FDR's and Churchill's wishes. They were constrained by domestic opposition from their legislative branches.

The chapter on Japan discusses what makes the domestic scene in Japan so unique. All of the chapters demonstrate that strategy assessments that focus only on realism, power and changes in its distribution, and external threat are incomplete. They do not account for what nations actually do. Other factors play a pivotal role in selecting a grand strategy, and influencing the prospects for international cooperation and conflict. These include: domestic groups, social ideas, character of constitutions, economic constraints, historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures. Under present international conditions such domestic forces may be increasing in scope and importance.

This is a sophisticated text which will appeal to political science students. Army officers enrolled in command and staff courses may also find the book useful in understanding a new direction in the political science field.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen
Kelly AFB, TX

Estonia: Return to Independence by Rein Taagepera (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 197 pages, $18; and **Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism** by Alexander J. Motyl (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) 197 pages, $18.

These two books are similar because they both look at new nations that were until recently part of the Soviet Union. However, this is the only similarity, and each appeals to a different audience. Both books, however, are excellent.

The Taagepera book is a narrative history of Estonia—the smallest independent nation in the world, with its own language and its own unique culture. Taagepera traces the history of Estonia from prehistoric times up to 1992, paying special attention to the period after World War I. It is an interesting and well-written story about this tiny nation on the edge of Europe.

As the author addresses recent changes in the Soviet Union, he uses his political science background effectively. Taagepera is a professor at UC-Irvine, and was elected to the 1991 Estonian legislature. As an Estonian native, writing of the return of independence to his homeland, he hurries through the details of elections; forming a new government; and playing tug-of-war with Gorbachev over freedoms, prior to full independence. Overall, this is a satisfying book on a rare topic.

Alexander Motyl's book is different. Ukraine has been part of Russia for hundreds of years. The famous Cossacks play an important role in Russian armies. However, Ukraine has always had an attitude of independence, leading to revolts against the Russian government. Ukraine's attitude of independence became fact during the reactionary coup of July 1991, when Ukraine proclaimed itself a separate nation.

Motyl covers these significant historical facts in a few pages. He then embarks on the main theme of his work. He explains the problems these former-communist nations face. Also a political scientist, Motyl is the general editor for the series that includes Taagepera's book. He stresses the political, social, and economic crises Ukraine faces. Ukraine is no longer a large state in a much larger nation. It is an independent nation, larger than France, that wants to stress its European rather than its Asian heritage.

The problems are mind-boggling and Motyl is not optimistic about the future of Ukraine. There are simply too many complex, overlapping issues to be able to fix them all in a few years. Western nations took generations to develop the governments, economies, and societies which we hope to see in Ukraine and in other former Soviet territories in the near future. Who knows, they might all become capitalist, democratic nations, but there is no telling when, if, or even how that might happen. This is a very intriguing book which provides plenty of food for thought.

Robert McMichael
Sierra Vista, AZ

Intervention or Neglect, The United States and Central America Beyond the 1980's By Linda Robinson (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991) 222 pages, $15.

This thoughtful book is full of insight into the problems in Central America and is a country-by-country analysis of U.S. methods in dealing with these problems. Linda Robinson was the Latin American correspondent for **U.S. News and World Report** from 1983 to 1989. She outlines key developments and closely examines both successful and unsuccessful U.S. policies.

The book's thesis is that U.S. intervention, whether military action or economic sanctions, can only have limited success at best. An increased reliance on diplomacy would have more impact. The author very effectively uses each country's history to support this theme.

Nicaragua is an excellent example of a situation where intervention did not work. Washington's micromanagement of the Contras interfered with their efforts to undermine the Nicaraguan government. At the same time, Soviet helicopter gunships helped the Sandinistas develop a highly mobile, hard-hitting force.

As pointed out in each chapter, diplomatic opportunities exist whenever a country has a poor economy. Problems occurred when the military in Central America did not answer to civilian authority. Under an autonomous military, atrocities are inevitable. The murder of Jesuit priests by the Salvadoran government made the U.S. look bad in giving aid to that government. Robinson examines Noriega's building of his power base by consolidating all police, immigration, and national guard forces into the PDF. The U.S. stood by without protest because of Noriega's perceived usefulness.

The close examination of U.S. policies in the region support the contention that America is a little "quick on the draw," when sound diplomacy could get better results. As the author points out, however, after a lengthy civil war, people tend to push for diplomatic solutions. This is not always the case before a war.

The final chapter contemplates the future of Central America, country by country. Robinson discusses the problems each country has and possible U.S. diplomatic action to help solve them. Throughout the book, the author cleverly supports the theme of using diplomacy rather than intervention. Written in a clear and concise style, **Intervention or Neglect** would be extremely useful to anyone who wants a greater understanding of U.S. involvement in Central America.

Keith Everett
Green Valley, AZ

U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History edited by James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), 237 pages, $24.

In recent years, the government has lifted security restrictions on numerous documents concerning American SIGINT operations in World War II. Taking advantage of these declassifications, two INSCOM historians, James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan, have collected 30 documents in "a modest attempt" to better illustrate the Army's contributions to the success of American SIGINT. The result is an informative and often insightful look at SIGINT, its procedures, potential, and problems.

Gilbert and Finnegan have selected representative memorandums, reports, and official histories to describe how the Army organized, staffed, and trained its SIGINT assets from the 1930's until the end of the war. However, the longest and most useful of the documents covers how the Army collected and produced intelligence and how it disseminated its product. The various readings provide glimpses of Army SIGINT from national to tactical levels, and across every major American theater of operations. The editors have also included examples of intelligence reports and intercepted messages. While hardly comprehensive, this collection of documents does capture the full range of Army SIGINT efforts.

As with most collections of this type, each document's utility varies. Taken as a whole, the collection gives a valuable portrait of how the Army built an effective SIGINT organization. In doing so, these documents offer a useful behind-the-scenes look at SIGINT. They reveal how the Army struggled to train analysts, to cope with resource constraints, and to organize for intelligence production. Particularly insightful are the extracts of the official history of the Signal Security Agency (later they became the Army Security Agency), and the after-action reports of SIGINT units serving in the operational theaters. The former offers a detailed discussion of the training, morale, work environment, methods, and organizations of the Army's national SIGINT structure. The latter gives a "nuts and bolts" look at how the field units collected, developed, and disseminated SIGINT, while overcoming ignorance and misconceptions of the tactical Army.

Although Dr. Finnegan provides a solid introductory overview, and the editors give brief remarks that help put the documents into context, this volume would have benefitted from stronger editorial involvement. The reader could easily get lost in the maze of details, or walk away with the wrong impression. Most of the documents cry out for explanatory notes that would give background information on people, equipment, and units. Charts that outline organizations and relationships would have been helpful. More important, the editors should have corrected misleading statements within the documents. For example, one of the histories describes the solving of the Japanese "main ground system"; yet the Army never solved the Japanese regimental codes. Moreover, the bias of the documents is clearly pro-SIGINT, and there is little to balance the overall impression that SIGINT was the only part of the American intelligence effort.

While more explanatory notes would be desirable, they would have made a good book even better. Gilbert and Finnegan have picked their documents well and produced a loose history of Army SIGINT during the war. These documents, even after 50 years, are remarkably modern sounding and offer today's reader a greater appreciation of the problems of interservice cooperation, the laborious process of analysis, and the importance of centralized control of SIGINT activities. This work goes a long way in helping us understand the Army's SIGINT contribution; however, it is only one step in the right direction. The Army's Center of Military History still needs to make a comprehensive examination of all of the Army intelligence disciplines and their roles in World War II.

CPT Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Monroe, VA

Military Intelligence, 1870-1991: A Research Guide by Jonathan M. House (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993) 165 pages, $55.

When I found this book in my local library, it appeared to be a very good intelligence bibliography. However, it fell from grace upon close examination. Jonathan M. House's **Military Intelligence, 1870-1991: A Research Guide** began as an exceptionally good concept, however, by the time it hit the presses it had slipped into mediocrity.

First, the book sells for $55.00, a hefty price for 165 pages of small, cramped type that strains the eyes.

The introduction is a discussion of intelligence categories, historical trends, intelligence historiography issues, and gaps in MI history. Although the author is very knowledgeable about intelligence, he tries to cram too much into his work. It frequently gets bogged down in unnecessary detail and skims over other sections with little explanation. Apparently, the author intended to begin with a strong overview of MI. He either ran out of time and commitment, or the publisher edited it to pieces.

The author does provide 881 annotated references on books and periodicals relating to a wide range of intelligence subjects. Unfortunately, it also contains quite a few misspellings of authors names. In addition, House divides the bibliography into seven chapters and further divides it into 24 subsections. The numerous subsections may be useful to some readers, but I found them confusing.

The author tries to provide many "extras," but even these are unfinished. He gives an author and subject index, but the author index is incomplete. He also provides a small appendix of acronyms and abbreviations, composed of words already defined in the introduction. The appendix contains 33 acronyms and abbreviations which are either extremely common (i.e., CIA and MI) or extremely rare.

While Jonathan House does provide very useful sources for researching a wide variety of MI subjects, he does so in a discordant and unrefined manner. Is the book worth using at your local library? Absolutely. Is it a book worth buying? Absolutely not.

SGT Eliot A. Jardines
Fairfield, CT

Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 by D. Clayton James (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1993) 282 pages, $25.

D. Clayton James is a noted MacArthur biographer. In this compelling study of command during the Korean War, he revisits the general's greatest military triumph and eventual personal defeat. Refreshingly, MacArthur is not the central subject of the work. James devotes substantial analysis to the other, less-studied commanders of this conflict: Generals Ridgway and Clark, and Admiral Joy. These chapters offer insight into their relations with MacArthur, Truman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chapter on Truman examines his early decision to commit U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula by drawing from Truman's experience as an Army officer in World War I, and his years of training as a pragmatic politician.

James also presents a thorough examination of key decisions of the war. In this section, James is sharp in his criticism of U.S. policy before, during, and after the war. He notes that careless diplomatic signals by the Truman Administration indicated the security of the Korean Peninsula was not an issue Americans would go to war over. This gave the North Korean leadership the "green light" to invade.

James also indicts America's diplomatic and military elite for the pervasive "ethnocentric, if not racial, bias that underestimated Asian capability and that persisted despite lessons learned from 1941-1945 from the Japanese." This refusal to acknowledge the strengths and capabilities of North Korean and Chinese forces, in James' opinion, accounted for such debacles as the disastrous campaign to liberate North Korea in 1950. This eventually brought Chinese communist forces over the Yalu. James also takes to task the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their inability to stand up to MacArthur over the conduct of the war.

Refighting the Last War is a well balanced, cogent study of the commanders and their decisions that shaped the Korean Conflict. For any student of this "forgotten war," James' work is extremely valuable.

MAJ Jack Thomas Tomarchio, USAR
Philadelphia, PA



337th
MI Battalion (TE) (Airborne), USAR

The 337th MI Battalion unit crest consists of a shield of silver, four flashes, and a winged dagger. The four flashes are in oriental blue, the color associated with MI units. The four flashes, issuant from dexter chief, sinister chief, dexter base, and sinister base, converge. The flashes allude to the convergence of speed and electronics, emphasizing the collection and assimilation of information from all sources. They underscore the unit's electronic warfare and SIGINT capabilities. The winged dagger symbolizes the intelligence role in total military preparedness while characterizing the battalion's diverse mission and functions.

The 337th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment was organized in the Reserve Corps and assigned to 1st Army on June 2, 1948, in New York City. It was reorganized and redesignated on July 6, 1950, as Headquarters, 337th Military Intelligence Battalion. It was inactivated on February 20, 1953, and relieved from assignment to 1st Army.

On September 16, 1988, the 337th was redesignated as Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company (HHSC), 337th MI Battalion, assigned to the 2d U.S. Army, and activated at Charlotte, NC.

The 337th MI Tactical Exploitation (TE) Battalion (Airborne) is the only airborne MI unit in the Army Reserves. During peacetime, the battalion has command and control of one HHSC company, four MI companies, and one MI corps tactical operations center support element (CTOCSE) located throughout North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. The 337th MI Battalion's mission is to support the 525th MI Brigade stationed at Fort Bragg, NC.

To prepare for their mission, the 337th MI Battalion integrates its training with its Active Component counterparts, the 525th MI Brigade, in exercises such as Dragon Fire, Solid Shield, and Ocean Venture. The soldiers also get MOS sustainment training at the Regional Training Site (intelligence) during annual training, inactive duty training, and field training exercises. The 337th conducted its first battalion-wide annual training in May 1993 and participated in exercise Ocean Venture—the unit's first battalion-size airborne operation, the unit's first joint tactical operation, and a signal collection training exercise.

In addition to exercises, 43 members of the 337th served during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 21 of its linguists (MOS 98C/98G) were ordered to active duty. An additional 22 volunteers served temporary tours of active duty exceeding 90 days while supporting the 525th MI Brigade. Five of those volunteers deployed to Saudi Arabia (three 98J's with the 319th MI Battalion on TENCAP systems, one 35E, and one 31C).

The 337th MI Battalion (TE) (Airborne) stands proud and ready to deploy anytime, anywhere to participate in force projection operations in support of the 525th MI Brigade and the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca
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

Headquarters, Department of the Army
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